Washington, D.C. : What's the most dangerous biological element? Is it smallpox or Ebola?

Dr. Ken Alibek: Everything depends on the skills and techniques of the people who are turning these agents into weapons. In general, smallpox is more contagious, but Ebola is more deadly. There are many other factors that would influence the outcome of an attack with a particular agent: weapon formulation, deployment techniques and equipment, terrain, meteorological conditions, deployment inside or outside of a building, etc.

McLean, Va: Dr. Alibek,
During "Desert Storm," and continuing through our bombings today, the U.S. has systematically targeted Iraqi water & sewage treatment plants: destroying them & preventing their reconstruction with "sanctions." Sanctions have also caused critical shortages in medical supplies. As a direct, and entirely predictable, result of this, hundreds of thousands of people - mostly children - have died of easily preventable & treatable diseases, such as cholera & typhoid. Why isn't -this- considered biological warfare? Isn't our hysteria over possible "bioterrorism" a bit ridiculous considering our active biowar against the Iraqi people?

Dr. Ken Alibek: First, I have no knowledge of attacks on water and sewage systems in Iraq during Desert Storm. I was still living in Russia during that war and am not familiar with these details.

Of course, it is difficult to support the idea of sanctions in any case, because the poorest segment of the target population suffers the most. However, in the specific instance of Iraq, I do personally support the idea of sanctions. We know that Iraq still retains the knowledge to create chemical and biological weapons--and probably also still possesses such weapons. Furthermore, my understanding is that the oil-for-food program provides adequate funds to address the basic food and medical needs of the populace--provided these funds are used properly. The money used for one of Hussein's palaces would go a long way towards providing proper food and medical care to the Iraqi people.

But it goes without saying that this situation must be resolved as soon as possible. Although I support sanctions against Iraq, I certainly would prefer that we be able to lift them.

Greenbelt, MD: Hi-- I have a question about the vunerability of drinking water systems from biohazard attack: many people fear that someone may contaminate their drinking water system with a biohazard, but just how effective is contamination of the drinking water system as a means of introducing a biohazard into a community? It strikes me that it's a much less effective strategy than airborne dispersion. And most people assume that the use of chlorine as the disinfectant in most U.S. drinking water systems shields these systems from a biohazard attack -i.e., massive introduction of a waterborne microbe such as rotavirus- because of the chlorine residual present in the water as it's distributed throughout the system. Is this a valid assumption? Also, many European countries are now using ozone as their disinfectant. Are drinking water systems using ozone more vunerable to biohazard attack? Thanks!

Dr. Ken Alibek: You are correct that the most effective means to deploy biological weapons is aerosol application, not water contamination. That is not to say that water contamination would be completely ineffective. But there are two huge obstacles to water contamination: first, the use of chlorine, as you mentioned; and second, dilution of the agent to insignificant levels. The amount of weapon that would be needed to contaminate the water supply system of a large city while overcoming the effects of chlorine/ozone and the dilution factor would be enormous.

Ozone is a very effective disinfectant. However, I can't give you a concrete comparison of ozone and chlorine, as I have no data comparing the two.

New York, New york: How well prepared is the United States to prevent against acts of bioterrorism? Are we safe, or is there more our government should be doing. And if yes, what?

Dr. Ken Alibek: Regarding US preparedness for bioterrorism, I would say that the US is paying much more attention to this issue than any other country in the world. This probably stems from the US experience with the Iraqi program combined with an understanding of the potential consequences of a bioterrorist attack. The biological threat began to be taken more seriously about 4-5 years ago, and at that point the amount of work done to counter the threat increased significantly. If we compare 5 years ago to now, there is a huge difference in our level of knowledge and preparedness.

But, of course, this doesn't mean that we are ready for an actual biological weapon attack. We need to have a better understanding of the actual bioterrorist threat; what types of biological agents can be used for terror weapons; how such weapons can be manufactured and deployed; what the most vulnerable targets are; and what we need to do to reduce casualties. We need to redefine our understanding of physical and medical defenses against biological weapons. And we need to understand that the most important area to work in is medical defense. The ultimate objective of any defense is to save lives, and medical defense--treatments, preventive drugs, etc.--is the best way to reach this goal. Remember, biological weapons cause infectious diseases.

Washington, D.C.: What do you know about Saddam Hussein's biological weapons capabilities?

Dr. Ken Alibek: Naturally, I have no first-hand knowledge, as I have never served as a weapons inspector in Iraq. We know from the work of the inspectors that Hussein was manufacturing anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, ricin, and some others. It's important to mention that he experimented with camelpox virus. It's clear that he was not developing biological weapons against camels! Camelpox virus is a very good model for smallpox virus as the two viruses are closely related. Smallpox was eradicated, and there are only two legal repositories of the virus: in Atlanta (CDC) and in Novosibirsk, Russia. Thus, it may be that Iraq has retained illegal repositories of the smallpox virus. However, the inspections have not located any smallpox virus. This is one reason to continue inspections in Iraq.

In addition, while I was still living in Russia, I saw a top-secret publication of the Soviet intelligence services that identified a large facility to research and test biological weapons located on two banks of a river. Unfortunately, I don't remember the name of the river. According to that report, it was a viral biological weapons facility. However, the inspectors have not found any active viral BW facilities such as the one described by Soviet intelligence. Again, I believe this is another reason to continue inspecting.

Let's also look at the weapons Hussein was developing. Why aflatoxin? The primary illness resulting from aflatoxin use is liver cancer, which takes years to develop after exposure. This obviously provides no military advantage. What would be the target population for an aflatoxin weapon? It is clear to me that this would be used against the civilian population of a country to cause long-term consequences. I would call it a genocide weapon for that reason.

Washington,D.C.: The knowledge you have is clearly damaging -- were you ever in danger from the authorities after your defection?

Dr. Ken Alibek: I was told that if I went back to Russia, I would never leave there again. When I asked the bearer of this information what was meant by it, I was told that it wouldn't cost more than $10,000 to "keep me silent". I interpreted that as a death threat.

Of course, I would like to stay alive! But you never know until something happens whether you are in danger. I have been in the US for 7 years now, and I figure if nothing has happened by now, nothing will. Moreover, it would be a very stupid thing for Russia to do, to try to get revenge. It would only create an international incident and make Russia look even more culpable than it already does.

NYC, NY: In all your years at Biopreparat, were you ever infected with the deadly agents you were working with?

Dr. Ken Alibek: In the early 1980s, when I was in charge of developing a tularemia biological weapon, there was an accident (a spill)after which I suffered severe fever and other symptoms resembling tularemia. As soon as I realized I probably had tularemia, I started taking massive doses of antibiotics, and I recovered. No laboratory diagnostics were performed, however, so I cannot say conclusively that I had tularemia. But all of the symptoms coincided with those of tularemia. Fortunately, I got no other diseases from the agents I worked with.

Silver Spring, MD: Are there any other countries manufacturing biochemical weapons that we should be worried about?

Dr. Ken Alibek: I of course do not have first hand information on any biological weapons programs besides the USSR's/Russia's. However, based on the information I have seen both from Soviet and American intelligence services, there are a number of countries that are considered serious biological weapons threats: North Korea, China, India, Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Taiwan, Israel, and some others.

There are many more countries interested in one or another form of military biotechnology. These countries are not involved in researching and developing actual weapons, but they intensively study biological weapons effects, possible application techniques, and so on. This type of work could be used for both offensive and defensive purposes.

Washington, D.C.: Why did you accept a job in such a frightening place?

Dr. Ken Alibek: Why does someone accept an invitation to develop nuclear weapons for the US? The basic reasons are probably exactly the same: patriotism, prestige, scientific opportunity. It wasn't until I was well into the work that I fully understood the nature and extent of the USSR's biological weapons program. The work itself, although dangerous, becomes routine fairly quickly when you're doing it every day. There are people in the U.S. who work developing medical defenses against dangerous biological agents, and their work involves extreme danger as well, albeit in pursuit of a much nobler goal. I am deeply appreciative of the risks they take.

Silver Spring, MD: What ultimately persuaded you to defect?

Dr. Ken Alibek: I could go on at length about this, but since we don't have all day I'll give you the short version. I had been nursing doubts for a long time regarding not the existence, but the extent of the USSR's biological weapons program. Then, in 1991, I was selected to tour U.S. facilities as part of a trilateral agreement (US/USSR/Great Britain) to foster openness and confidence. During these tours, I realized that the US in fact had absolutely no biological weapons program. I decided to quit my job. As soon as I returned to Russia, I resigned my Army commission (I was a colonel) and left all of my scientific and administrative positions. In the wake of the breakup of the USSR I decided to return to my native land, Kazakhstan, but the Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan in June of 1991 made it clear that they wanted me to continue my biological weapons work. At that point I realized I couldn't stay in Kazakhstan either, so I came to the US.

Somewhere, USA: What does camelpox virus do?

Dr. Ken Alibek: Camelpox virus is a poxvirus, related to cowpox, smallpox, monkeypox, ectromelia (mousepox), and a number of other such viruses. It causes "smallpox" in camels, but is not particularly infective for humans.

Silver Spring, MD.: Would Dr. Alibek tell us about the current activity of Biopreparat or of its successor organization if the name has changed. And is the activity truly civilian or otherwise?

Dr. Ken Alibek: Biopreparat is now a "Russian state stock company", but it's hard to understand what that actually means in terms of ownership and control. Biopreparat pretends it is no longer involved in any biological weapons activity, but the same person, General Kalinin, is still in charge of the organization. Many of its employees still hold military rank. It is still guarded by Ministry of Internal Affairs forces. Some of its employees are part of the FSB (the successor to the KGB). As far as I know, right now, Biopreparat is not actively conducting any biological weapons research or development. But it's highly likely that Biopreparat is trying to retain at least the knowledge, expertise, and experienced people for possible future biological weapons needs.

In addition, remember that Biopreparat was only one branch of the USSR's biological weapons program. Russia still has 3 or 4 military biological weapons facilities that remain strictly closed to outsiders.

Washington, D.C.: When weapons inspectors are trying to find evidence of biotoxins, what exactly are they looking for? Isn't it possible to destroy the equipment that makes the substance and have the manufacturer be able to hang on to a sample of the toxin?

Dr. Ken Alibek: First, let me clarify your terminology a bit. A toxin is an inanimate protein that is in essence poisonous. It is not a live bacterium or virus. Biological weapons can be based on live agents (bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae, fungi) or on toxins (many of which are produced by bacteria or fungi).

You are somewhat correct that the equipment could be destroyed while agent samples are retained. However, the biological weapons developer would need equipment to grow sufficient quantities of agent for a weapon and to process the agent into a weapon (raw agent does not equal weapon).

Somewhere, USA: Is there any realistic way to protect oneself from this threat?

Dr. Ken Alibek: I'm not sure whether you mean individually or collectively. If you mean individually, no, I don't think there is anything an individual citizen can do to better protect him/herself against biological attack.

However, collectively there is much that can be done. As I mentioned earlier, we need to focus on developing medical defenses against biological weapons. I believe someday we will be successful in the endeavor to develop broad-spectrum defense against these weapons.

Arlington, VA: About a month ago, the House Military R&D Subcommittee held a hearing, with Gordievsky and C. Andrew as witnesses. Rep. Weldon asked them if they knew of any biological warfare agents that had been stored in the US or Europe. Their answer was no, they knew of none. Gordievsky, I think, said he wouldn't be surprise however -room acoustics were not good-. Would you agree or disagree with his comment?

Dr. Ken Alibek: To clarify a bit for our audience, as I understand it you are referring to the Soviets (Russians) storing biological weapons in the US or in Europe. I cannot answer this question as I have no reliable information either way. Of course, it could be done, technically speaking.

Washingtonpost.com: Unfortunately, we've run out of time -- thanks so much to Ken Alibek and all our participants for an informative hour.

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