Frontline: The Invasion of Iraq
Eamonn Matthews
Producer
Friday, February 27, 2004; 11:00 a.m. ET
Frontline marks the first anniversary of the Iraqi War with a two-hour
documentary investigation that recounts the key strategies, battles and
turning points of the war from both sides of the battlefield. Through
firsthand accounts from many of the war¹s key participants -- from strategists in Washington to the soldiers who actually fought the battles -- "The Invasion of Iraq" provides a definitive television history of America's most recent war.
Producer Eamonn Matthews was online to discuss the report.
"The Invasion of Iraq" airs Thursday, Feb. 26 at 9 p.m. ET (check local listings).
Editor's Note: washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control
over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.
Fairfax, Va.:
Why did you virtually ignore the role of the Air Force and Navy? You emphasized the attempts to bomb Saddam and ignored the far more important story--the Air Force destroyed most of the Iraqi Army. Your presentation suggested that the Army destroyed the Medina division, tank-to-tank, but it was the Air Force--through a sandstorm--that destroyed those tanks you showed burning at the side of the road. Was it just because you couldn't get any footage? I think this is a black eye for Frontline, which I have always admired.
Eamonn Matthews: You've raised a really important point. I'd dispute the fact we ignored the air force (or navy. They played vital roles. But anyway.. Air power meant Iraqi forces couldn't move in the open. Now in effect that rendered them non operational: but they weren't destroyed. BUT the fact is that the Air Force found it really hard to find the Republican Guard because on the whole they didn't move. They stayed concealed under palm groves or in civilian areas they were remarkably hard to find. (Hence the need for the big apache raid.)
Incidentally another big problem was that at night the Iraqis would light some charcoal and put it under some scrap metal to generate a heat signature that looks remarkably like an idling tank engine.....
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Orange Beach, Ala.:
Mr. Matthews,
I watched the show last night and thought that it was excellent.
This is a story that needs to be told, and I hope that it gets the audience that it deserves.
The reluctance of the administration to be interviewed was not surprising to me, since they did not seem to be anxious to hear any other dialog on the eve of the war, or to take advice of experienced military personell during the war.
I was wondering if you had any pressure from the administration to spin the story in any way.
Thanks.
Eamonn Matthews: None at all. The military were helpful – but the politicians gave no help to us at all, so their opportunities for spin were non existent.
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Herndon, Va.:
This was an outstanding program! Would it be correct to say all the high-level coalition military commanders were surprised at how much of and how quickly the Iraqi military/police infrastructure disintergrated?
Eamonn Matthews: Absolutely. And this had huge implications because they’d hoped that coherent Iraqi units would surrender/join the coalition cause and help police the country once the fighting stopped.
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Albuquerque, N.M.:
Your report seemed to over-emphasize the innocent casualties of war. War is a terrible business and should be undertaken only with much prayer and deliberation. There will always be unfortunately poor decisions based upon bad information that result in disastrous consequences for apparently innocent victims. This has been the case in every just cause even though every effort has been made to avoid them. As heart wrenching as these stories are, they do not in any way remove the very reason for going into a just war. There are things in this world that are worth dying for and one of them is freedom. If we determine that life is more important than freedom, we are doomed to live lives of slavery and terror.
Eamonn Matthews: I agree with much of what you say. But civilian casualties did matter - first because we’re humans;; second because if you want to portray yourself as a liberator and not an invader they must be utterly minimised. A key issue here: The US army has a policy of ‘force protection’ – protecting members of the armed services, not minimising civilian casualties takes priority. Interestingly the British forces do not. They argue it’s better to risk some casualties if it means keep the civilian population on board, because you’ll save casualties later. Tough choices: but I wouldn’t be surprised to see US policy shift somewhat as US forces remain in Iraq…
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Leland, Mich.:
I tuned in expecting Frontline's usual insightful and balanced look at the material, but instead found a brutally honest, "lessons learned" presentation. I think this is a legitimate approach, and you make some valuable and well documented criticisms. What was the thinking behind this approach? Why not balance the critical points by remarking on how quickly American and British forces identified their mistakes and adjusted their tactics in the midst of battle?
Eamonn Matthews: I think – indeed I know – many of the issues we raised are exactly those the top commanders were and are concerned with. And we wanted to impart that knowledge to a wider audience. I hope - and believe - we were fair. A lot of these issues will take years to work through however...
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Minneapolis, Minn.:
My question,
Why did I see only about 30 seconds of cheering Iraqi children, and about 5 minutes of Crying Iraqi fathers, with mornful music.?
Are we accuratley being reported to by your documentary..?
Or is there subtle undertones that I should be aware of?
Why does the media want to convey to the American people, that we are the bad guys and should be ashamed of the hard work that are soldiers are enduring?
Why not show the Iraqi parents of children that have been released from prison, just to balance?
Or the survivors of the gassed villages?
Eamonn Matthews:
The commanders – as they explained – had expected to be met with popular uprisings. That never happened. Cheering crowds were a rare commodity – for the reasons we explained
There are no undertones: the lack of poular support was a surprise to all on the ground - and it mattered
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Portland, Maine:
I appreciate Frontline--I think it's one of the best
shows on television. My only complaint with the
coverage of the war in Iraq, is when reporters
continue to say that the war is over, simply
because the Republican Guard quit last summer.
The war is still going on. Our troops are still being
killed in combat in a very active insurgency. The
objective of establishing a stable democracy in
Iraq is a long way from completion. Until our
troops are home and the objectives are complete,
let's not say the war ended last summer.
Eamonn Matthews: I agree. Our film was an attempt to explain that if you understand the way the invasion played out, you can start to understand what's happening now.
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Alexandria, Va.:
One thing that really shocked me was the zero for fifty record on "decapitation" strikes. I certainly remember a few of them but had no idea we had tried so many times.
But still, didn't anybody figure out that after missing one or two dozen times that there was no reason to continue this ?
Eamonn Matthews: The problem was they often thought they were getting the people they were after at the time. I think you'll find there's a lot of thinking going on..
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Burlington, Mass.:
Hi,
There were reports in some media circles at or after the fall of Baghdad that some of the Iraqi Army generals had been paid off to not fight. Now I do realize that misinformation and confusion is also a part of war. Did you come across any such information while researching for the documentary.
Eamonn Matthews: There were extensive efforts to buy off Iraqi generals. But no US commanders we talked to believed that these efforts produced any substantail results. Most of the Generals preferred to melt away rather than surrender
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Kennesaw, Ga.:
Two unrelated questions for you: first, did you get a sense of how soldiers on the ground in Iraq regarded the journalists embedded with their units? Most of what we've read about this has been written by the journalists themselves; I was interested in hearing how the embed program looked from the other side.
Second, during the protracted prewar negotiations with Turkey over a northern front, the 4th ID was kept in the Mediterranean instead of being shipped to Kuwait where it could have been useful if the invasion had run into trouble (and, after the war, in doing things like securing Iraqi weapons dumps that ended up not getting done because we didn't have the manpower). Did you get the sense that anyone in the military regards this now as a mistake?
Eamonn Matthews: I think the answer to your first point is - it depends!
The coalition clearly had enough troops to take Iraq - because they did it.
They didn't have enough troops to police the country afterwards. Some commanders believe if the 4ID had been available this would have avtered some of the vacuum into which the insurgency flowed.
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St Paul, Minn.:
I thought it was interesting hear that our intelligence for post invasion Iraq was lacking. I would agree with that, however I think your program (which was superb) also failed to note the key reason why we failed. Our intelligence community failed to bring to the forefront the overwhelmingly obvious... that the personnel infrastructure in Iraq were all Baathists. Doctors, teachers, police, civilian authorities all were Baathists. Saddams regime was extensive and localized. When our troops rolled into Baghdad they fled, creating a vast power vaccuum that led to civil chaos. Your program didn't make this clear at least directly. -- Your thoughts?
Eamonn Matthews: I'd put it a different way. Many Iraqis were happy to see Saddam toppled. But they weren't going to lift a finger to help the coalition in case of future retribution. And so they melted away....and that's how the power vacuum came about. The 'fear factor' was underrated.
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New York, N.Y.:
Many organizations like Human Rights Watch have slammed the US for the extensive use of cluster bombs that killed so many civilians in Iraq, yet you did not touch on that. Did your investigation show it was not as big a problem as we have been led to believe?
Eamonn Matthews: Problems of time...most of the cluster munitions came from artillery rather than aircraft. They were carefully targetted but some went astray. Just as importantly a significant proportion of bomblets failed to explode..and they're just the type of thing childdren are drawn to play with.
The military are concerned about all this - not least because they often have to advance through these unexploded munitions
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Vail, Colo.:
What became of the Apache units after the unsuccesful raid? Were they used again?
Eamonn Matthews: No major raid was launched using the tactics employed in that first raid. Another of those issues the military are thinking hard about - because it's awkward when some of the most amazing weapons technology in the world can be neutralised by low tech.
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Detroit, Mich.:
At the time of the war, I thought that the emphasis on embedded reporting was likely giving a distorted view of the war. Do you think news outlets should be so willing to have embedded reporters?
Eamonn Matthews: Embedded journalists traded some freedom for access. In making this film many of them were marvellously helpful in sharing their experiences and insights - and because of the access they had these were often unique.
Overall I guess it's good to have a mixed economy - 'unilaterals' and 'embeds'.
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Frontline: Propaganda Machine:
Your report "The Invasion of Iraq" has to be one of the most biased accounts of a US victory that I have seen.
Describing the American destruction of an Iraqi military convoy as "a slaughter" on one hand and contrasting these words with an "analysis" of Iraqi civilian casualties on the other, was laughable in it's transparency.
It is obvious that this was one of the first attempts to re-write history of a brilliant US military campaign. In less than one month the US military ousted a brutal regime that systematically terrorized it’s citizens. This regime hid in civilian residential areas, fought in civilian clothing, and held families hostage to force its troops to fight. Our US fighting force did an incredible job in extracting these thugs from their hiding places while showing extraordinary care to minimize civilian casualties and destruction.
Your reports attention to all of the coalition’s so called “failures” could only be described as an Alice in Wonderland approach to journalism. War is messy; but to characterize the Feda'iyee Saddam, with your editing of interviews, as “heroic” and following that story with more stories of American “failures” made me wonder if there was ANY editorial leadership on this project at all.
All was not lost though. It did make me laugh out loud.
Eamonn Matthews: We're interested in truth, and reaching a balanced perspective.
As I've said elsewhere in this chat I know that many of the issues we highlighted are just those the commnaders were concerned about. And they'll be issues that are studied and thought about for years to come
I think we showed the achievements of the coalition: but to pretend that difficulties didn't exist lessens that achievement.
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Fairfax, Va.:
I had the first question, at top. I'm sorry: your facts are wrong. Aircraft were able to hit the Iraqi armored vehicles, repeatedly, en masse, because they were cued by Joint STARS ground radar and Global Hawk synthetic aperture radar. Each confirmed target got a Joint Direct Attack Munition, which works quite well through clouds, smoke and obscurants like the sandstorm. There was no "pause" in the operation; while the Army and Marines were slowed to a crawl by the storm, airpower continued methodically destroying the Iraqi army. While some vehicles may have escaped by hiding, the vast majority were destroyed from the air. Airpower also guarded the Army and Marines' flanks, further enbling the success of an invasion with such a small ground force. You really need to do an update to correct the record.
Eamonn Matthews: Glad to welcome you back, because we spent days debating and investigating this, and asking top commanders about it. JSTARs etc works against an enemy on the move - and does so brilliantly.
But a lot of the Iraqi forces didn't move. Now that kept them out of the battle and so they were militarily ineffectual. But it also meant they survived. Saddam thought he'd be able to use them in a 'dug in' mode to inflict heavy casualties. Instead the 3ID bypassed them...the Medina division ended up being attacked from the rear.
NOW - air power was vital. It destroyed Iraqi forces whenever they moved. But by the end of the war a lot of pilots couldn't find anything to hit because the forces didn't move.
So - i think we're sort of agreeing
Also
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Lyme, Conn.:
I recall during the invasion asking if there were counts or estimates of Iraqi death-military and/or civilian. No one seemed to know. Finally, one journalist responded that it was policy not to release these figures, because the military did not want to turn Iraq into another Viet Nam where the nightly news would provide the public with daily casualty figures on both sides. Still the question remains: do we have any figures on the number of Iraqi deaths: military and/or civilian?
Eamonn Matthews: A really difficult question. In the chaos a lot of record keeping fell by the way. I've seen estimates of 3,000 up to 10,000. But all of these estimates are heavily qualified
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Quebec, Canada:
Were the Kurdish freedom fighters a key part of the strategy? If so, will Kurdistan adventually be liberated from Arab occupation?
Eamonn Matthews: They were important inasmuch as they helped secure the northern front, which originally was where the 4ID and the British were going to attack.
As to the last question - better addressed to the Turkish government!
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Oakton, Va.:
How did you choose the title "Invasion of Iraq", with Invasion being the key word? It's an intersting choice, as maybe the White House would have preferred "Liberation" or "Freeing"...
Eamonn Matthews: What ever this was it was certainly an invasion. And so we though invasion would be the cool, dispassionate word to use.
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Exeter, R.I.:
I'd be interested in hearing more stories of how this military operation has been/ is being perceived by the Iraqi people you spoke with. Is this an invasion or a liberation? Earlier, you mentioned innoncents killed in this operation. Do their families and communites see these deaths as unfortunate tragedies, or...?
Eamonn Matthews: Many Iraqis have different views. But rightly or wrongly it was our strong impression that many Iraqis view what has happened as an invasion and not a liberation. And that perception is one reason for the state of Iraq today..
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Montreal, Canada:
Great documentary. I was wondering how you tracked down the Saddam Fedeyeen? And did you ever think Iran will capitalise on Iraq's situation after the Coalition leaves the country?
Eamonn Matthews: Tracking down the fedayeen was tough and took a lot of investigation and persuasion on the ground in Iraq. And matters were complicated because their casualties were amazingly high, and so survivors were few.
It's important to realise that the fighters who took part are not part of the current resistance, but did fight during the invasion itself.
Interestingly, Saddam was convinced the Iranians would attack when the coalition attacked. They didn't, but of course are now trying to play a role in the Shia politics of the south, just as they always have. However the commanality of Shi'ism often does not overcome the Persian-Arab divide, and so the influence of the Iranians is often more limited than some imagine
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Columbia, Md.:
"There are no undertones: the lack of poular support was a surprise to all on the ground -- and it mattered."
Sorry, but you are just completely wrong here. My husband just returned after a year in Baghdad, and he never encountered any hostility whatsoever. On the contrary, everyone he worked with or encountered in the street thanked him and said -- though some wanted it kept quiet -- that they were thrilled Saddam was gone and the Americans were there. That the Americans needed to be there. Iraqis have no sense of civics or representative government, and have the mentality of an oppressed, powerless people. They do need help, even regardless of the now-moot issue of whether we should have gone in in the first place.
Eamonn Matthews: I don't think we're disagreeing at all.
The commanders had expected the Iraqi people to take an ACTIVE role in overthrowing Saddam. But they were too fearful to do that, and so took a PASSIVE role. The administrators, the police, the army usually didn't resist..instead they melted away. And that left a power vacuum into which the violent insurgency could flow. That's what I meant by the lack of popular support.
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Richmond, Va.:
I would first like to thank Frontline for what I thought was an incredibly balanced look at the Iraq war. I was particularly impressed by the extensive inclusion of Iraqi military and civilian opinion and in-sight, which I didn't think I would hear for many years. My question is how did you find some of the civilians you interviewed and how did you verify their stories. Finally, do you think this episode of Frontline will ever be shown in Iraq?
Eamonn Matthews:
We had an arabic speaking producer who worked on the ground for many weeks tracking down eyewitnesses. They were interviewed on and off camera at length to check for inconsistencies, and their accounts were usually cross checked with Iraqi eyewitnesses who chose not to appear.
And in many cases the experience of US troops matched what the Iraqi eyewitnesses were telling us.
There's no reason why the episode should not be shown in iraq. We hjope it will be We just need someone from Iraqi Tv to give us a call I guess...indeed they may already have done so
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Fairfield, Calif.:
First, let me say that it was the best of the shows I have seen so far on the topic of the Iraq war.
I'm going to quote one of your answers to a previous question:
"Cheering crowds were a rare commodity –- for the reasons we explained"
As a member of Regiment Combat Team - 1 I can tell you without a doubt that at just about every city we rolled through HWY7 was lined with Iraqi's cheering us on. When we entered Baghdad the streets were empty but by the time we got to our first objective there were people everywhere.
Now, I don't think they were ready to fight for their freedom. However, I don't think the Iraqi army was ready to defend it's country either.
On the subject of looting. For anyone to say that we didn't have enough forces there to take care of that problem is incorrect. My unit was in a position to stop much of the looting that occured in our area but we were told not to unless it involved weapons.
On the subject of civilain deaths. Do you think that some of those people bare responsibility for their actions? There were many times that I was at the end of a column (in Baghdad) when a vehicle would approach us. If the driver didn't get the idea that he was getting too close with a hand signal, raising my weapon at them worked 100 percent of the time.
I'm certain that if those people would have stopped they would not have died.
thanks again for the good job on your program.
Eamonn Matthews: Thank you for your kind words - particulalrly as they come from someone who was there.
In no particular order. I absolutely agree that the Iraqi army melted away - they took a passive role. I think your analysis is spot on.
On the looting front I'm not going to dispute that in your sector matters were fine. However I'd draw your attention to the comments from General McKiernon and General Wallace, as well as the British commanders in Basrah. Their feeling was that they were stretched - that there was a power vacuum and that helped foster lawlessness. And many units we spoke to had to make decisions about what institutions to guard and what to leave open.
Many of the soldiers we spoke to have abiding memories of rolling into ghostly fearful towns - just as you encountered in Baghdad initially. When they did see crowds they told it was unusual..and that's what we tried to reflect. But your experience is a useful reminder that nothing in an event as large as this is cut and dried..
Civilian deaths: one for you and your colleagues to ponder. Does the doctrine of Force protection in a semi-peacekeeping environment save lives - or create casualties by alienating the civilian population. I think it's really difficult issue...
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Port Townsend, Wash.:
With your strong impression that many Iraqis view what has happened as an invasion and not a liberation, what do you think that the reason is? What would be necessary to change their impression?
Eamonn Matthews:
Most Iraqis are glad to see the back of Saddam. But for many history and geopolitics - above all Israel/Palestine - colour their views of America. Changing that impression will take much more than improving the electricity supply: and if it can be achieved it will be a major achievement
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