Following yesterday's approval of a new Palestinian cabinet, the United States officially released a plan designed to revive stalled peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians. The so-called "road map," crafted by the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and Russia, comes on the heals of another deadly suicide bombing last night in Tel Aviv. Still, the latest initiative represents Washington's most aggressive attempt in two and a half years to revive negotiations between the two sides.

David Makovsky, a senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, will be online Wednesday, April 30 at 3:30 p.m. ET to discuss the American diplomatic initiative, the future of the peace process and the latest developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Makovsky is an adjunct lecturer at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies and a contributing editor to U.S. News and World Report. He is the author of the book "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord (Westview Press/HarperCollins in cooperation with The Washington Institute, 1996)." As a journalist, Makovsky covered the Middle East peace process since 1989. He served as executive editor of The Jerusalem Post and was diplomatic correspondent for the Israeli daily Haaretz. His articles on the Arab-Israeli conflict and peace process have appeared in the Washington Post, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Wall Street Journal, Foreign Affairs and The National Interest.

Below is the transcript.

Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.

washingtonpost.com: Thank you for joining us Mr. Makovsky. Can you tell us why so much stock has been put in the latest peace plan proposal? What does this "road map" contain that earlier initiatives have lacked?

David Makovsky: The Roadmap is different than past peace plans for a variety of reasons. Among them, it is supposed to be "performance-based", namely reciprocal steps by both Israelis and Palestinians, as opposed to strictly timetable driven. The core tradeoff is to provide Palestinians with a statehood as long as Israel security needs are protected. If both sides fulfill their respective obligations, Palestinian statehood may occur as soon as 2005.

London, UK: Why is there little or no mention of the hostile, Arab states surrounding Israel in the Road Map? Doesn't a truly just peace for Israel come only when it is legitimately recognized in the entire Arab world? Israel has been fighting off eradication long before 1967?

David Makovsky: Indeed, the Arab states are critical for a peace process to succeed. Abu Mazen's new government cannot succeed if the Arab states do not help. This means a few things: First, easing the transition to a post-Arafat era, by marginalizing Arafat who has made clear that he opposes dismantling terror groups like Fatah's own Al-Aqsa brigades that has been involved in suicide bombings. Second, Arab states need to echo Abu Mazen's call at the Palestine Legislative Council in Ramallah yesterday when he did not just condemn terror, but delegitimized it as undercutting hopes for Palestinian statehood and said he would not allow anyone but government officials to carry weapons. In this regard, Arab countries could also cut off the money flow coming from their own countries to Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad. Third, they need to help provide Abu Mazen's government with the political cover it needs in reaching a successful conclusion of the peace process. Finally, they need to talk to their own publics and the Israeli publics about the moral legitimacy of the two states, Israel and Palestine. They have not done these things in the past, and thus contributed to the collapse of the last peace process. Inshallah, Arabic for God's help, they will act differently this time, or else I fear it will fail again.

washingtonpost.com: Is a rivalry and perhaps open conflict between Yasser Arafat and Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas inevitable? How likely is it for the two to share power and attempt to negotiate a peace settlement given their disparate positions and reputations?

David Makovsky: I think you have asked the biggest question of all, namely how will these two succeed to work together. I must say that I am very skeptical they can. In a speech that Abu Mazen gave to Fatah activists in Gaza not too long ago, he was scathing in his criticism of Palestinian failures saying that the Palestinians have allowed the Palestinian rejectionists a free hand, which resulted in their ouster from Jordan in 1970 and Lebanon in 1982, and said the "militarization" of the last two and a half years of violence has led to the disappearance of Israeli allies. Abu Mazen has called for national responsibility over national unity, and I fear that he will be sabotaged by Arafat who is wedded to the old way.

Amman/Jordan: I contend that no peace is possible as long as Israel is enjoying total and unconditioal American support.
I also contend that America is unable and/or unwilling to throw its weight behind "The Road Map"despite the fact that it had more influence in formulating it than all the other members of the Quartet combined.
Would you care to comment or you totally agree ??

David Makovsky: The most immediate goal of the Roadmap is to stop the deteriorating slide of the 'war process' that we have seen for the last two and a half years. It provides a political context for both Israelis and Palestinians to have a direct dialogue, and sort out their problems. In this context, the Roadmap could create the context for the moderate Labor to join the current Israeli government and thus broaden the basis for peace. The Roadmap can give a set of guidelines, but ultimately it is the parties who have to negotiate peace.

Baltimore, Md.: It seems premature to talk about a new "peace" process until the last process, Oslo, has been studied. Why did Oslo fail, and how does the roadmap differ form Oslo that makes it more likely to be real and potentially succeed?

David Makovsky: Oslo failed for many reasons, and I am writing something about the lessons of Oslo. Suffice it to say that there was too little accountability for the parties own actions, too little focus on conditioning the societal landscape for peace, and no expending of political capital to take on rejectionists. This critique is not just of the parties, but of the Arab states in the region who did not want to incur political capital by providing political cover for compromises. Finally, there was inadequate leadership. I cite Saudi ambassador to the US Prince Bandar, who fumes at Yasser Arafat for his refusal to accept the Clinton Parameters at the end of the Clinton Administration. In a profile of Elsa Walsh in the New Yorker (3/24), Bandar said that Arafat's refusal to accept this deal was not just a mistake but a "crime" against his own people and the entire Middle East.

New York, NY: How can Abu Mazen effectively combat Palestinian terror without a security apparatus and, due to only a 3% approval rating from Palestinians, without sparking off a civil war?

David Makovsky: Part of the Roadmap calls for the consolidation of the Palestinian security forces, and training by Jordan and Egypt. Actually, the training will not be difficult, since many of them underwent counter-terrorism training in the US. In general, I think the capability exists, but the problem has been the political will. Abu Mazen's speech yesterday lays out the critical idea that terrorism has undermined the cause of Palestinian statehood. Arafat has never tried to delegitimize terror. To the contrary, he publicly exhorted people to "martyrdom", and opened the prisons letting killers out on the streets.
Of course, Abu Mazen cannot act alone. As Israelis see key steps towards calming the situation and threats are reduced, Israelis will be able to ease restrictions. As well, they will need to enhance monthly back payments and dismantle outposts in West Bank that illegal under Israeli law. If Palestinians see their life is improving, I am sure Abu Mazen's numbers will go up sharply. In the poll you cite, a large majority were not opposed to Abu Mazen or supportive of Arafat, but rather fence sitters. Actions on the ground will bolster his public support.

Los Angeles, CA: Is Palestinian 'Right of Return' a realistic/practical demand? Wouldn't it essentially be the end of Israel as a Jewish state, or is that the whole point?

David Makovsky: The issue of Palestinian refugees has often been misunderstood by the broader public. In Camp David and the subsequent Clinton Parameters, every Palestinian refugee would have the right to immigrate to the new state of Palestine, so the squalor of refugee camps in the Arab world would end. The question centered would the refugees have an automatic right to go to two countries--Palestine and Israel, and not just one. On its face, it makes little sense. One of the goals of this peace process is to establish a Palestinian state, so the national refugees should have an interest in bolstering that state and not moving to a Jewish state. Leading Palestinian moderate Sari Nusseibeh said that Israel would be "crazy" to accept a Right of Return since this would end the idea of a Jewish state. This issue should be resolveable.

Berkeley, Calif.: The critical question, more critical even then ending the violence, is whether Palestinians are willing to have a a Jewish state in the region as their neighbor. Do you believe the Palestinian Auhority is willing now or will ever be willing to renounce a full right of return -- the hope that Mr. Arafat and others have been nurturing in the hearts of Palestinians for decades? Doesn't failure to renounce that dream reveal an unwillingness to abide by the results of the 1948 (not 1967) war?

David Makovsky: As I cited Palestinian moderate Sari Nusseibeh in answering the last question, an unfettered "Right of Return" means the end of the Jewish state. There are many creative ideas out there to resolve this question. The tragedy is that Mr. Arafat has never accepted the moral legitimacy of the Jewish state, so he never sought a creative solution. On this issue, you can look at the article I wrote in the current edition of The National Interest called Taba Mythchief where I explain why we were not on the verge of a deal at Taba. However, I hope that under Abu Mazen's leadership, a broad peace deal will be reached and both sides will enjoy dignity and coexistence in a two state solution.

Washington, D.C.: Are there in your view any similarities between the present situation in the wake of the war against Iraq, and the situation after the 1991 Gulf War (US leverage towards the parties, etc)? Also, what is your take on the real intentions of the Bush administration? Some analysts claim that the US wants to get a peace agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians to improve its image amongst Arabs. Others, however, believe that the Bush-administration is not willing to push Israel to any great extent due to fears of alienating potential Jewish voters within the US in the next presidential election. Any views on this? Thank you.

David Makovsky: The hope is that just as the radicals were in disarray after the last Gulf War providing peace a chance with the convening of the landmark 1991 Madrid peace conference, so too will the result of this war to bring new hope for peace. (It may be pointed out that Saddam Hussein's Iraq gave the family of every suicide bomber $25,000.)Yet, we need to be informed by the experience of the 1990's, and learn the appropriate lessons. I have outlined some of them above. As I tried to point out in an op-ed in the NYTimes on April 14th (I hope Washington Post won't be upset by mentioning a rival), we are now at a hopeful moment because an alternative course of suicide bombing will have been tried and discredited. With Israel rooting out suicide bombers and President Bush making clear on June 24th that Arafat was not a legitimate interlocutor, the net effect was to demontrate to the Palestinian people that Arafat has no strategy for statehood. This bolstered the reformist critics, and led to a heretofore toothless Palestine Legislative Council rebuffing Arafat's efforts to undermine Abu Mazen. It is not enough for others to complain about the US. Arabs, Europeans, and Israelis have to join together in making the transition to the post-Arafat era. It is not enough to call for the US to engage. People I know who want to get engaged, buy a ring. They work for it.

New York, N.Y.: Oslo fell apart with the death of Prime Minister Rabin did it not? How can normalcy be reached under the current conditions of economic/military pressure on the Palestinians? Isn't any Palestnian attempt to reign in control of the terror groups doomed without the help of an outside neutral force? UN NATO?

David Makovsky: I disagree on both counts. Yes, Rabin was a giant of a man and as such deserves to be etched into the Mt. Rushmore of the Middle East. But, if Mr. Rabin was DeKlerk, Arafat was no Mandela. He was more like Mugabe, and this is the tragedy. While Rabin successor Ehud Barak was willing to give up his life by making concessions on Jerusalem, Arafat told 60 minutes that he feared for his life.
You need strong leadership on both sides and this did not happen.
On peacekeepers, the success of the Multinational Force Organization in the Sinai or the UNDOF on the Golan is that these are peacekeeping units that monitor tank movements and the like in sparsely populated areas, where there is no insurgent population. Monitors can monitor tanks, but they cannot know if someone is plotting to make a suicide bomb in the basement. We saw with the failure of plopping UNIFIL in Lebanon between interposing forces like Hizbullah that works out of civilian villages and Israel, it does not work.
It comes down to this, if the Palestinians do not want to police against terrorism, peacekeepers will fail. If they do want to police, the monitors won't be needed. The key issue is political will.

washingtonpost.com:

That wraps up today's show. Thanks to everyone who joined the discussion.

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