Reputed al Qaeda operations chief and Sept. 11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed was arrested over the weekend in Karachi, Pakistan. U.S. authorities said they expect a trove of leads from interrogations he is undergoing and Congressional intelligence committee leaders said they are hopeful Mohammed's capture will quickly lead authorities to other al Qaeda figures, including perhaps Osama bin Laden

Dr. Bruce Hoffman, vice president for External Affairs with the RAND Corporation and an expert on terrorism, was online Monday, March 3 at Noon ET, to discuss Mohammed's capture and the war on terrorism.

Hoffman is an internationally recognized expert on terrorism, who has written extensively on terrorism in both academic and popular journals and who has testified on terrorism before Congress. His latest book, "Inside Terrorism," was published by Columbia University Press. He is also editor-in-chief of "Studies in Conflict and Terrorism," a scholarly journal in the field.

The transcript follows.

Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.

Clifton, Va.: Does Mohammed have control of operational bank accounts? If so can we expeditiiosly acquire to dry up the cell funding? Would this render a majority of those active cells ineffective if not inactive? How likely is it that "we" and move quick enough to thwart any planned attacks, That maybe accelerated due to this capture?

Dr. Bruce Hoffman: Yes, KSM (Khaled Sheikh Mohammed) should have control to at least sum (though what percent or what amounts are unclear) operational banks. This seems clear given previous interrogations of al Qaeda terrorists which pointed to KSM's pivotal role in the financial orchestration, as well as operational planning, of the 9/11 attacks. I suspect we will act as rapidly as information about the bank accounts is obtained from KSM's interrogation. It is impossible right now, given the available open source information, to describe the extent to which, and how many, operational cells will be affected. It is likely though that the blue-chip al Qaeda cells, that is the most dedicated, committed, well-funded and therefore potentially effective cells, will be most directly impacted by KSM's apprehension: if only in sowing apprehension and fear and prompting them to defer or cancel operations and generally to move to new and different locations and develop new and different means of communicating given that all this has now been compromised by KSM's arrest. At the very least, his arrest will have a profound disruptive effect on the al Qaeda. To what extent and for how long, though, are the unknown questions. We will also move as quickly as the information is forthcoming to abort actual attacks. That can likely be accomplished even in real time given the global thrust of our counter-terrorism operations.

Lowell, Mass.: What is the expected strategic impact of the capture of Khalid Sheik Mohammed in the war or terror?

Dr. Bruce Hoffman: KSM was a key lynchpin in al Qaeda. He was the one of the main persons charged with translating bin Laden's threats and saber-rattling into action. His loss will have likely have a significant strategic impact on the organization. In some respects, the apprehension of a key, second tier operational commander like KSM potentially has a devastatingly effectively disruptive and damaging effect on an entity like al Qaeda. By taking out a key player like KSM, the effects radiate both upwards--depriving the most senior leadership of al Qaeda (e.g. bin Laden) of a key conduit of orders to the foot soldiers below --while also effectively radiating downwards--cutting the foot soldiers off from instructions communicated by the supreme leaders of the organization.

Baltimore, Md.: I can understand the political pressure to trumpet the arrest of Mohammed, and to gloat over his capture. But, from a military standpoint, for this kind of war, would it not be tactically preferable to keep his arrest secret?

Wouldn't it forestall immediate revenge attacks? And would it not put the al Qaeda organization into even more disruption if a key person were to suddenly -- without explanation -- disappear?

Dr. Bruce Hoffman: A very good question, but there are two issues to bear in mind. One is that with KSM removed from the scene and out of communciations with both the al Qaeda senior leadership and the foot soldiers below, both would very soon come to the only obvious conclusion: that he was killed or apprehended. So, there is a limit to how long the terrorists themselves would really be "in the dark" before realizing what had happened. Given how sophisticated al Qaeda's communications capabilities have been--even after the massive US-led military operations in Afghanistan last year--they are likely still connected with one another and would be aware when someone was missing. Second, the US was neither operating alone nor within its own borders, which means we are to an extent dependant upon the cooperation of our ally--in this case Pakistan. Their wishes to publicize this significant advance in the global war against terrorism was doubtless very important to them politically both internally and for their relations with other countries in the struggle against terrorism. So far as revenge attacks are concerned: al Qaeda is already constantly planning and plotting terrorist attacks both in the US and against American interests abroad. My view is that they don't need any excuses to attack us: today this is as natural to them as breathing. Accordingly, this does not create new problems for us or opporunities for them. Rather, I think it has the opposite impact: demonstrating truly that terrorists can run, but they can't hide from the US and also now having significant repercussions on the al Qaeda terrorists still at large, who must be looking over their shoulders and paying more attention to their own personal safety and security in the wake of KSM's arrest, rather than devoting their full attention to planning attacks against us.

Atlanta, Ga.: Sir:
I've read of the al Qaeda network discribed as more of a loose confederation of independent cells than a hierarchical "chain of command" model. Is this true, and, if so, might the cells continue their plans regardless of this recent arrest?

Dr. Bruce Hoffman: al Qaeda operates on both dimensions: that is its strength. It has no one, single modus operandi and leaves no one clear footprint. That being said, the part of the organization that STILL appears to be operating on something of a hierarchical basis, with some command and control capabilties still in evidence, is likely that associated with so senior an operative as KSM. In this respect, the damage done by his apprehension will most likely affect precisely the most competent, dedicated, hardcore and therefore--lethal and effective--al Qaeda elements. You are correct that it may not have much direct affect on the looser, more indpendent elements of the al Qaeda constellation. But even with them: the fear of apprehension, in other words, if a "big fish" like KSM, with all his operational tradecraft and attention to personal security and countermeasures designed to foil the authorities from tracking him down, can be identified and apprehended: the small fish must be thinking how easy it is from them to be swept up in the global counterterrorism net as well.

Rosslyn, Va.: Approximately how large is the leadership of al Qaeda and how many more leaders are out there?

Is al Qaeda a cellular organization that brings leadership from within -- i.e. will some of their foot soldiers or lieutenants step in to fill the gaps left by vacancies in the leadership? Can we be certain that the decimation of the leadership will leave the organization purposeless?

Has the U.S. taken any steps to disrupt al Qaeda recruiting at the religious schools?

Dr. Bruce Hoffman: Various reliable open source reports put the number of senior key leaders at present at round 20. Of this number, we have killed or captured 8--nearly half. You are correct though that Al Qaeda has already demonstrated a remarkable ability to replenish its leadership ranks--especially a the mid-level, operational, field positions--and carry on the struggle. In this respect, they are almost like the archetypal "shark in the water": having to constantly move forward, while slightly altering direction, to survive. Doubtless, as part of the "corporate succession plan" that bin Laden crafted for al Qaeda previously, someone will step in to fill KSM's shoes. However, in his case, his role was so pivotal to the organization, his ability to translate dreams of attacks into operational plans so effective, that he is arguably about as irreplaceable as anyone in that movement could be. Afterall, he is believed to have had a hand in almost all the high-value, blue-chip terrorist operations throughout the world that al Qaeda has either attempted or carried out in the past decade. His loss, simply given his extensive range of contacts and institutional memory for the movement, is enormous. KSM's apprehension is an especially important step forward in the struggle against al Qaeda and may well prove to be a critical leap forward in the decimation of its key exisiting leadership. It will also likely prompt many to question al Qaeda's longevity or ability to survive the concerted onslaught directed against it by the US and our allies.

Dearborn, Mich.: Do you think the capture of KSM is more important than capturing (or killing) bin Laden?

Dr. Bruce Hoffman: In operational terms, almost as important as bin Laden: simply because KSM was the main point person in al Qaeda charged with implementing bin Laden's threats and achieving his heinous vision of world-wide terrorism. IN other words, KSM was the man of action; to what we can see bin Laden as the man of thought. So, KSM's arrest is very important in that respect. However, as the epitomy of al Qaeda, as the embodiment of its philosophy and vision, and indeed as its uncontested leader, bin Laden remains a pivotal and critical figure in the movement--especially given his name recognition and his power (in various parts of the world) to inspire, motivate, animate and actuate terrorism against his and al Qaeda's enemies. KSM's arrest may be the beginning of the end of al Qaeda; but the end may only come with the apprehension or death of its preeminent figure and leader--bin Laden.

Herndon, Va.: Mohammad is still in Pakistan's custody according to BBC and still in Pakistan. Not what the U.S. news sources are reporting. Your thoughts?

Dr. Bruce Hoffman: It's hard to say. Yesterday's reports--citing or quoting Pakistani sources--spoke of a formal "rendition" of KSM to American hands: which would suggest that the legal formalities of putting him in US custody were accomplished. Indeed, based on past patterns and experience of recent arrests of leading al Qaeda figures, that would be the standard procedure. But there may be new information that points to a delay in that process.

San Francisco, Calif.: Can you address the question of to what degree of efficacy a loose "bloc" of extremist activity is understood and combatted as a global terror network or whether global terror might more effectively be combatted by addressing the local points of discontent and unrest that are taken advantage of by such a network. I'm referring specifically to the situation in the Phillipines, where it seems that the problems that such networks take advantage of, if dealt with, would more effectively combat terrorism than direct military intervention.

Certainly attacking the actual network and cells of al Qaeda will be helplful pace the capture of KSM, but what of the larger and more longterm battle against terrorism?

Dr. Bruce Hoffman: Very good point. I don't think though that it is--or has been--an "either or" proposition. The US in particular is moving to counter terrorism on both these dimensions: bringing military force and the power of law enforcement to bear where and when appropriate, but also not neglecting the more local, parochial "root cause" issues that give rise to instability and sentiments that can be exploited by terrorists and in turn lead to larger-scale violence. the problem is that the gratification from an arrest of a terrorist is almost instant; whereas the fruits of these equally important, but longer-term in respect of time, appear less quickly and sometimes take years to manifest themselves in clear metrics of success. This is an area of counterterrorism that is vital: but where we also need to be extraordinarily patient with.

Newport News, Va.: Can you speculate on what kind of real good useful info may turn up in the house where KSM was staying at the time of capture?

Dr. Bruce Hoffman: The two main distinguishing characteristics of al Qaeda operatives was their need to network with one another (e.g., communicate regularly) and their reliance on high-tech means--laptop computers, cell phones, satellite phones, etc.--to do. Each of those vital communciations objects to al Qaeda will likely yield a veritable gold mine of information of contact names and numbers, details of when they contacted and perhaps where, and therefore radiate outwards potentially to weave together a whole web of terrorist operatives worldwide.

Bridgeport, Conn.: What is the relationship between KSM and bin Laden's son Saad?

Dr. Bruce Hoffman: That's an excellent questions, since Saad bin Laden is precisely one of the new, young "stars" who has moved forward since 9/11 to replenish the ranks of other mid-level operational cadre who have been killed or captured. It is hard to know right now with any certainty or precision, but Saad bin Laden had been elevated to the same operational/managerial level at which KSM operated, so it is not unlikely that they were in touch.

Bethesda, Md.: Computer equipment and files were captured as well with KSM -- will this allow us to track down the rest of the network?Why do you think the capture of this material was made public?

Dr. Bruce Hoffman: See the above reply with respect to the importance of the computer equipment and files. The significance of making public this material is to attempt to "smoke out" the terrorists who may suspect that information both identifying them and perhaps pinpointing their locations may be on that equipment. By forcing them to pull up stakes, and suddenly move, we increase our opportunities to identify them while on the run and apprehend them as well.

Washington, D.C.: Dear Dr. Hoffman,
Two questions: 1. What methods are deemed most effective in extracting timely information from someone like KSM (e.g., as to operations, cell locations, etc.)? Good cop or bad cop (or both?)

2. Initially, OBL's complaint with the U.S. seemed based solely on our military presence in Saudi Arabia. Is that still the core motivation for al Qaeda to attack American interests, or have the events of the past year and a half enshrined a whole new basis for hatred, independent of whether we stay in Saudi Arabia?

Dr. Bruce Hoffman: The means and methods used to obtain information from al Qaeda are of course among the most closely guarded secrets in the war against terrorism. For good reason. Revealing those methods, however generally, would provide terrorists still at large with invaluable insights into our counterterrorist operations and enable them to develop effective countermeasures of their own.

bin Laden's animus against the US has gradually expanded beyond the initial stated purpose of driving the US and western allied military forces from Saudi Arabia to fomenting transnational radical Islamic rule, e.g., the re-establishment of the Caliph, the supranational Muslim religious leader of Ottoman Empire times, over all Muslim lands. In that respect, the hatred and animus that drives bin Laden, as you point out, now does go beyond just driving the US military from Saudia Arabia and has assumed the proportions of a global struggle.

Dr. Bruce Hoffman: Unfortunately, I have to log off now. This has been a fascinating exchange, with excellent and informed questions posed. It has been a pleasure to be able to communicate and interact with such an intelligent audience.

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