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'Avoiding Armageddon':
Biological and Chemical Weapons
With Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D.
Vice President, Biological Programs NTI
With Amy E. Smithson
Senior Associate, Henry L. Stimson Center
Tuesday, April 1, 2003; 1 p.m. ET
The U.S. has mounted an invasion of Iraq to, in the words of President Bush, disarm Saddam Hussein of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The new documentary, "Avoiding Armageddon" examines the threat of terrorism compounded by WMD -- nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Producers traveled to some of the most dangerous places in the world, such as Iraq, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kashmir and throughout the Middle East to gather material for the film. The series is hosted by journalist Walter Cronkite, and each episode concludes with a discussion on the provocative issues raised, moderated by veteran journalist Frank Sesno.
Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D., vice president for Biological Programs at Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), and Amy E. Smithson, a senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center and director the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project, were online Tuesday, April 1 at 1 p.m. ET, to discuss the upcoming series and the biological and chemical weapons.
Before coming to NTI, Dr. Hamburg was assistant secretary for planning and evaluation at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. She is a physician and expert in public health and bioterrorism. Dr. Hamburg was the commissioner of health for the City of New York and former assistant director of the Institute of Allergy & Infectious Diseases at the National Institutes of Health.
Dr. Smithson has conducted analytical research across the spectrum of complex topics associated with the control and elimination of chemical and biological weapons. She has published widely in journals, testified before Congress, and is frequently consulted by the electronic and print media.
"Avoiding Armageddon," the inaugural production from Ted Turner Documentaries, airs on PBS Monday-Thursday, April 14-17, 2003, 9:00 p.m. ET (check local listings).
The transcript follows.
Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control
over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.
washingtonpost.com:
Has there been any real progress in the investigation of the 2001 anthrax scare?
Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D.: My sense is that at this point it is moving slowly. It remains a mystery -- as well as the motivations of the attack. It is an important reminder about how difficult the threat can be in terms of ever identifying the source or perpetrator and the importance of building more effective partnerships between public health and law enforcement.
Long Beach, Calif.:
Assuming that humans learn from past
mistakes, what is your opinion of Bush 43
preventing us from learning about the chemicals and poisons the Reagan/Bush administration gave to Saddam's regime?
Are we more "secure" by withholding this
valuable information?
Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D.: The question is posed in a peculiar way. But I think it is important to recognize that historically there has been a very open of scientific knowledge and materials. This has been done primarily to support the advance of science and it's one of the great strenths of science -- international sharing of ideas. We need to build on the promise of international science, but in this new era, we need to recognize that we must be mindful of the misapplication of scientific materials. We need to examine security and safe handling of biological materials and develop international standards. We also need to think about and engage the scientific community fully on the question of are there ways to limit the misapplication of knowledge that are emerging from scientific advances.
Bioterror?:
I was wondering what your thoughts were on the speculation that the new SARS virus sweeping through Southeast Asia could be bio-terror, or just a naturally occuring virus. Are there any telltale signs that a new outbreak is a bio-weapon instead of just a natural occurence?
Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D.: I think this outbreak has all the earmarks of a natural event, but again it reminds us about the potentially close connection between naturally occurring diseases and the intentional use of a biological agent to do harm. There are certain things that would alert you to a bioterrorism attack over a natural event, but this does not appear to follow that pattern. The truth is that potentially one might never know. SARS certainly tells us that we have a long way to go in improving our systems for recognition and response to infectious disease outbreaks. We need to be able to rapidly recognize that something unusual is going on, to investigate the nature of the outbreak and implement disease containment and control requirements. We need better diagnostics so we can recognize the unknown more quickly and we need new drugs and vaccines to treat and/or prevent disease. These kinds of issues apply whether its a bioterror attack or a natural outbreak.
Binghamton, N.Y.:
I understand the U.S. is still not a signatory to international treaties outlawing chemical and biological weapons. Would it reduce the risk of these weapons by terrorists if we were?
Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D.: I believe that the U.S. is a signatory to both the bio and chemical weapons conventions. With respect to the bio weapons convention, we did not sign on to what's called the Chairman's conference language -- I wish I had the technical language down -- but at recent discussions, the U.S. has not signed on to the inspection protocol and the Chairman's text. The U.S. position was that the inspection protocols would not provide what it purported to provide in terms of protection and assurance about covert weapons programs. In my view, while the specific inspection protocol may not have been adequate, we need to extend those discussions in order to strengthen the BWC and recognize that we need -- internationally -- to develop additional strategies.
Washington, D.C.:
How surprised would you be if WMDs are never found in Iraq? And how ridiculous would the U.S. look? Thank you.
Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D.: We may not find WMD in Iraq, but we know the regime has been interested in WMD, has had them in the past and, in fact, has used them in the past. So I think we cannot be too complacent about the threat in Iraq and I think we all hope and pray that they will not in fact be used against either the Iraqi people or military troops.
Washington, D.C.:
What defines a Weapon of Mass Destruction? How many lives dead? How many buildings destroyed?
Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D.: The term Weapon of Mass Destruction is a misleading one. It refers to nuclear, chemical and bio weapons that would be deployed to cause many thousands of deaths. But when you think about terrorism, you don't need mass destruction to cause mass disruption. In the anthrax case, there were only 5 deaths, but it had an enormous impact in causing panic and disrupting our economy. Many are rethinking the value of the term. We're talking about events that would be catastrophic in nature, but we do need to recognize that some of the threats would have the potential to take lives measured in the thousands and more. It's a continuum of concerns that begins at massive disruption through massive damage and destruction to massive death.
Melbourne, Victoria, Australia:
What responsibilities should the scientific community have in restricting research and dissemination of information regarding weapons of mass destruction? Should governments enact laws and set up departments to restrict and regulate the activities of scientists?
Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D.: An excellent question. The scientific community has a very special set of roles and responsibilities -- particularly the biological threat. We need the best minds in science to help our policy makers think through these questions and concerns. A number of recent experiments, including one from Australia, involving mousepox, have raised red flags about the issues of "dangerous science." And it is certainly the case that advances in science hold both enormous promise, but increasingly can be misapplied to cause serious harm if that is the intent. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to define areas of "dangerous science." Because the tools that hold such power to protect and improve health are the very same tools that if misused can become tools of terror. The knowledge and skills of scientists today are very powerful and scientists and the scientific community need to respond in the most responsible way to this enormous power that they hold, but it is not a simple thing to regulate and restrict. Efforts are underway to try to bring the scientific community to the table with policy makers to develop strategies to manage the risks, to develop standards of practice and codes of conduct for science today and in the future. We also are actively involved in trying to develop strategies that will improve security in our labs without hindering legitimate responsible and important science.
Bethel, Maine:
Thank you for providing this information and opportunity for participation! It seems to me that the decision to obtain and use WMD, or terrorism, as an instrument of policy is a symptom, rather than the real problem. Both N. Korea and Iraq suffer the symptoms of despotic leadership; one political, the other religious.
My question is: Aren't we, in effect, just "trading a headache for an upset stomach" by trying to resolve these conflicts militarily as opposed to orchestrating a global campaign to win ideological wars that these surely are? Isn't the military approach wasting precious good will and time so urgently needed to address the real, prime causes of these conflicts?
Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D.: We live in a time of enormous transformation with respect to critical issues of power, poverty, equity and we will not be able to overcome the threat of terrorism without addressing as best we can the underlying causes of terrorism. What are the conditions that allow terrorism to emerge and take hold as a political and ideological strategy. The power of individuals to do enormous harm today is very real. We cannot completely prevent that threat by pursuing simply military strategies. We need to think comprehensively and address this issue in a multi-faceted way that more deeply understands intent and doing somethign about the conditions that foster hatred and terrorism of the type we have been seeing.
washingtonpost.com:
Dr. Hamburg is through answering questions. Amy Smithson will be with us momentarily to continue the discussion.
Washington, D.C.:
If the possibility that the SARS virus could be, or is linked to, Chinese bioweapons programs, what do you think the likely purpose behind its release would be? Is this perhaps an instance where a few rogue actors within the People's Army unleashed something, or does there seem to be more at work here?
Amy Smithson: One of the biggest difficulties that's faced those who are trying to improve the deep surveillance is understanding what the source of an outbreak is and specifically identifying the disease in question and time to take life-savign intervention. While on one level it's important to understand if the disease was intentionally spread so those responsible can be arrested, on another level it's important to be able to save lives.
China is one of the governments that the U.S. believes is harboring a bioweapons program. However, I have seen no indication other than speculation that the source of the SARS outbreak is from anything other than a natural cause.
Binghamton, N.Y. (again):
I've been reading the "Avoiding Armageddon" episode descriptions at the WETA Web site. The dangers seem so huge and so intractable as to be beyond the influence of individual citizens. As an expert in the field, what do you wish individual citizens would try to do to reduce these risks?
Amy Smithson: The first thing they can do is to become better informed about these threats and about other risks that are much more mundane, but equally, if not more life threatening. For example, many Americans are worried about bio and chem attacks, yet they hop into their cars and don't buckle up. Some 43,000 Americans every year die in automobile accidents. Your chances of getting struck by lightening are 1 in 600,000 and on average, roughly 330 Americans perish every year in their bathtub. Now, lets put this in perspective and understand that the chances of any individual person becoming the victim of a terror attack are very low.
As far as what citizens can do, I'd encourage them to be very vocal in insisting that their government put forth its most serious effort to strengthen international regimes designed to reduce these threats. I'm speaking here about the chemical weapons convention and the biological and toxins weapons conventions. As a professional in the field, I have been disappointed by my government's action in relation to these treaties for several years.
Another very useful program to be informed about is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. This is aimed at reducing the proliferations threat resident in the former Soviet Union which had prodigious nuclear, chemical and bio weapons.
Amy Smithson: For more information on these programs go to www.stimson.org and click under the non-proliferation project link.
Long Beach, Calif.:
Was the transfer of bio/terror material
to Saddam for "the advance of science"? The
story of Reagan/Bush and Saddam is outside
the realm of science. It involves the perversion of science for covert and ethically bankrupt operations involving death
on a grand scale. It involves the USA as willing cohorts in gas warfare. ACCOUNTABILITY is the operative word, no?
Amy Smithson: Let's separate fact from fiction. While it is true that the some seed culture for Iraq's bioweapons programs did come from a U.S. culture collection and a British collection, these materials were transferred to Iraq under the guise of legitimate research and in order to find cures for diseases, scientists need to study them and understand what medical treatments can be used to save lives. Iraqi scientists requested the seed cultures for that reason.
It would be wrong to characterize those transfers as the U.S. government having knowingly abetted a proliferator. Similarly, chemical companies from the U.S. and several other countries sold Iraqi and Iranian companies what are known as "dual-use chemicals" -- they have a legitimate commercial purpose (making chemicals, fertilizers, dyes). These chemicals could also be used to make weapons of war.
In the mid-1980s, several governments recognized that the Iranian and Iraqi governments were procuring these chemicals to make weapons and began taking active measures to clamp down on such sales. This effort is known as the Australia Group and it now involves over 30 goverments who harmonize export controls on chem and bio equipment and materials to hinder the proliferation of these weapons. See the Stimson Center web site above for more info.
Washington, D.C.:
Would you comment upon the use of smallpox as a biological weapon, and the fact that -- until Sept. 11 -- the U.S. was planning to destroy its remaining samples of the smallpox virus? I believe that the lesson of this near-miss also speaks to future consideration of destroying ANY dangerous viral or biological agent. Do you agree? Thank you.
Amy Smithson: The first thing is that your facts are wrong. According to the WHO countries around the world who had possession of Smallpox were required to destroy these stocks over the past couple of decades. The two exceptions were the U.S. and Russia. And actually the decision for the U.S. to retain its smallpox stock at the CDC predated Sept. 11. So that's the factual part of it.
I believe that there are some diseases that could have such a devastating effect on the plant and animal population that they need to be retained and studied with utmost care and scrutiny to ensure they're not diverted into weapons programs. There have been any number of stories speculating that terrorists would become smallpox suicide bombers. On the one hand, while it would not be difficult for a terrorist group to recruit individuals for this, on the other hand, the leaders of the terrorist group would probably do themselves more harm than they would do the U.S.
Yes, an outbreak of smallpox in this country would be tremendously difficult and many lives would be lost, but the U.S. has an ever growing stockpile of vaccines and an increasingly strengthened public health system. Those advantages are not present in the countries where al Qaeda and other terrorist groups would hope to recruit new members. Smallpox would literally end up in those countries as well, taking a much heavier toll. The effects here would be difficult, there would be devastating. I think the leaders of these organizations understand this.
Bottom line, it would do them more harm than us.
Long Beach, Calif.:
The anthrax attacks of 2001 point out, in my opinion, the need to control military dirty tricks and dirty weapons programs, and to monitor the participants. Since when does law enforcement have any control over the military? Since when does the medical community or medical ethics have any sway with the Pentagon?
Amy Smithson: Many people are under the impression that the U.S. has an offensive bio weapons program, but that is not the case. President Nixon got us out of that dirty business. Since the early 1970s, the U.S. military have maintained a defensive program, which is entirely legitimate under international law. The bio weapons convention bans the weapons, but permits defenses, because it is necessary for governments to be able to research vaccines and antidotes and to test defensive gear like gas masks. These programs are conducted with stringent and overlapping oversight within the Pentagon and from Congress. Any time that a specific process is proposed, it is reviewed many many times by countless lawyers and others before any defensive work is taken to ensure that it is in compliance with domestic and international laws.
While the strain of anthrax that was used in the letter attacks in the fall of 2001 was a military strain. The factor that is not widely recognized is that that strain may have been shared informally, scientists are curious people and therefore is going to be very difficult to determine who is responsible for those attacks.
Phoenix, Ariz.:
Thank you for taking my question. It is possible Saddam Hussein has already "pre-treated" the land in and around Baghdad with bio weapons? For example, if anthrax were to be sprayed out in the areas thought to be avenues for the American/British forces, what would be the possibility of infection?
Amy Smithson: In general, biological agents are very succeptible to environmental stresses such as sunlight and variations in temperature. Therefore, this particular scenario is not that plausible. In order to make a human sick, a biological agent has to arrive in the human system alive in microscopic particle sizes and therefore leaving it out of doors for several days would not be an effective strategy.
The other thing to note is that anthrax is a disease found in nature, so individuals who work around cattle, sheep, on farms, are also likely to be more familiar with the risks here. Go on a farm, tromp around in the soil and probably, you could have something on your shoe. That doesn't mean your life is in jeopardy.
Last, but not least, coalition soldiers are well equipped with gas masks and protective clothing and are trained to use this equipment to save their lives.
Amy Smithson: The most likely victims would be Iraqi civilians. That is why the U.S. goverment is a member of the treaty that bans chemical weapons. Their militaryies understand that civilians are oftne the ones harmed.
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