A wave of anti-American sentiment is spreading throughout southern Iraq. U.S. officials are worried about the growing number of Iranian operatives who are pouring into the country, supporting a Shiite resurgence and opposing U.S. plans to install a friendly government.

Fawaz Gerges, professor of Middle East and international affairs at Sarah Lawrence College and author of the forthcoming book, "The Islamists and the West," was online Wednesday, April 24 at 3 p.m. ET, to discuss the relationship between Iran and Iraq and the Shiite community and Iran's concerns with Iraq in the post-Saddam era.

Gerges is also author of "America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?"

A transcript follows.

Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.

washingtonpost.com: Thank you for being with us today Professor Gerges. What role is Iran playing during the reconstruction of a government in Iraq? Is it true that Iranian operatives are moving in, supporting the Shiites and that they oppose U.S. plans for the country?

Fawaz Gerges: Iranian leaders perceive Iraq to be a very important theater for the politics and security and culture and religion of Iran. Let's remember that more than 60 percent of the Iraqi population are Shiites and in this particular sense, being the only Shiite state in the dominant Sunni world of Islam, Iran has a vested interest in making sure that the Shiites in Iraq are fully represented and their political and religious weight is given prominence. Iran is also deeply concerned about America's military presence in Iraq. After all, President George W. Bush has referred to Iran as part of the Axis of Evil. In this context, Iranian leaders are anxious about Iran being the next target after Iraq and they do not want the Persian Gulf to become an American military lake. This possibility would threaten not only the strategic interests of Iran in the Gulf but also the political survival of the Islamist regime in Tehran.

For all these reasons, I would not be surprised if Iran does not get involved in the internal affairs of the Shiite community in Iraq in order to have negotiating cards to use against the U.S. in case of a confrontation.

Wheaton, Md.: Isn't it inevitable that Iran (and Turkey) will invade Iraq as soon as the U.S. pulls out?

Fawaz Gerges: There's a high risk that if Iraq descends into civil strife as ethnic, political and religious tensions escalate out of control that its regional neighbors, particularly Turkey, Iran and Syria, would feel tempted to militarily and politically intervene in Iraq in order not only to protect their allies and interests in Iraq but also to create spheres of influence in the country.

West Chester, Pa.: Professor Gerges, thank you for being with us today. In your book "The Islamists and the West" you postulate that democracy is bound to fail in the Arab world since the concept of democracy does not exist in Islam. Could you please elaborate on this? Thank you.

Fawaz Gerges: I don't subscribe to the assertion that Islam is incompatible with democracy. On the contrary, I would argue that Islam can be used and utilized to advance a variety of political and ideological constructs, including liberalism, socialism and fundamentalism. In fact, Islam has been used and abused by a variety of political actors who basically impose their own ideological interpretations on Islam wrapping these interpretations with Islamic symbols. In this context, it's not Islam that we should be focusing on but rather the political and ideological orientation of groups and individuals who have particular agendas to advance. Islam is not the independent variable here.

Cumberland, Md.: I have read that there are present in Iraq many Shiites with ties and possibly being funded by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Council. Should we make an effort, even if military force is necessary, to deport these individuals back to Iran?

Fawaz Gerges: The critical question is much broader and more complex than that. What the American invasion has done not only to shift the internal balance of power dramatically in favor of the Shiite community long marginalized by the Saddam Hussein regime but also show the political weight and strength of conservative religious forces. In fact, if elections were to take place in Iraq today, political Islamists would win easily. These conservative religious forces tend to be influenced by the Iranian model and would like to Islamicize the state and society. They look to Iran and to Iranian conservative Mullahs as an inspiration. It's not just Muhammad Baker al-Hakim who basically is influenced by the Iranian model. A host of Iraqi Shiite clergymen are also intoxicated with Ayatollah Khomeini Islamic revolution. The question here is not just one person but rather a social force being unleashed which is influenced by the Iranian model and would like to recreate that Islamic model in Iraq.

The answer to this social dynamic does not lie in the use of force which could prove to be counterproductive but rather in creating counterbalances, counterweights to the conservative religious forces. This effort will take time, resources and investment in institutional building. What the U.S. and the international community should do is to assist Iraqis in building intracommunal and intercommunal coalitions and alliances that transcend narrow ethnic and religious lines. These intra- and intercommunical and religious alliances could serve as a counterweight to the pro-Iranian conservative religious clergy. They could provide the building blocks of a more liberal, more inclusive political order in a post-Hussein Iraq.

Mexico City, Mexico: What do you think of the so called "jihadism"? Is it real or is it just a piece of the neoconservative discourse?

Fawaz Gerges: When the U.S. invaded Iraq a few weeks ago, many calls for jihad (resistance or Holy War) reverberated in Arab and Muslim lands. Mainstream distinguished Muslim scholars and preachers urged Muslims to resist the American invasion of Iraq. Using the concept of jihad as a mobilizational tactic to motivate young Arab men to volunteer, to travel to Iraq and assist their Iraqi counterparts. Ironically, the concept of jihad was not used as to mean "Holy War" as the conventional wisdom in the West has it, but rather as part of a call for resistance against the invading American troops. This was truly a major devlopment in Muslims religious use of the term "jihad." Similar to that, the concept of a just war in the Christian West. In the end, however, we should not exaggerate the operational value of the calls for jihad. The war over Iraq was a nationalist, geostrategic struggle, not a religious confrontation. Many people both in the world of Islam and the U.S. perceive it in this way, even though some try to impose a layer of religion on an essentially nationalist, geostrategic conflict.

Viborg, Denmark: How do you see the future of the Saudi regime with its big Shiite population now that Shiites will play a vital political role in Iraq? Shiites have been dominant in Iran but that's not an Arabic country, Iraq is ...

Fawaz Gerges: Saudi Arabia does not have a large Shiite population as do Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait. But what the Iraqi crisis has shown is that suppressed religious and ethnic minorities tend to have major grievances that undermine not only internal stability but also the social and nationalist fabric that preserves national unity. If the Iraqi crisis has taught us anything, it's that the concept of citizenship, not ethnicity, religion or tribe, should be the overriding umbrella unifying a national community.

I think Saudi Arabia along with other Arab and Muslim states, if they are to preserve political stability and national unity, have little choice but to fully empower their civil society regardless of its ethnic and religious composition.

The big question is the following: If Iraqis succeed in rebuilding their lives, state and society, and creating representative institutions, Iraq could serve as an example for other Arab states to imitate. But if Iraq fractures and descends into civil strife, I fear that militant forces would be empowered and authoritarian, autocratic regimes would crack down further against dissent and civil society. So the question is really up in the air at this stage. It mainly depends on developments in Iraq in the next few months and few years.

Washington, D.C.: Professor Gerges, I apologize that I have not read your recent book which I am sure addresses this question, but do you subscribe to the view that a "clash of civilizations" between the East and West is inevitable, or do you believe that instead, national interests will remain one of the most, if not the most important factor governing international relations?

Fawaz Gerges: My book addresses the very same question and my judgment is that the conflicts that are taking place between the world of Islam and the U.S. have more to do with political and economic aspects than with a clash of cultures or civilizations. One point must be made very clear, the Iraqi regime was one of the most secular regimes in the Arab world. It had no claim to either Islam or Islamic politics. The confrontation between the U.S. and Iraq is an essentially nationalist and geostrategic struggle and has little to do with religion and culture. Unfortunately, President George W. Bush's use of religious terminology generated a similar religious rhetoric on the other side. And yes, there are some small constituencies in the U.S. and the world of Islam who would like to convince us that the two camps are bound to clash because of their ideological and religious differences. In fact, Osama bin Laden tried very had to mobilize the Muslim Umma, the Muslim community worldwide, by claiming that his attack on the U.S. was an extension of the clash of religions that has been waged by the U.S. against Muslims: "the clash of the camp of belief vs. the camp of disbelief." Fortunately, there were few buyers for this polarized narrative. Bin Laden's apocalyptic nightmare did not materialize. Most Muslims saw through his inflated, poisonous rhetoric.

One would hope that these two small segments in the western and Muslim camps are not provided with the ammunition to wage their unholy war at our own expense.

Woodbridge, Va.: Professor,

Where are the women of Iraq? The media has been swooning over the fact that Iraqi's can finally practice their religion the way they want to, and yet we see no women. Did the U.S. free the Iraqi's or just the men?

Thanks.

Fawaz Gerges: By the end of the 1970s Iraq not only had one of the most secular civil societies in the Arab world, but also some of the freeist women as well. Despite its brutality and suppression of personal freedoms, the Iraqi regime used oil wealth to create a highly advanced educational system along with the largest middle class in the Arab world. Of course, Saddam Hussein's military adventures along with the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990 have bled Iraqi civil society dry and crushed its middle class, including the freedoms enjoyed by Iraqi women. Iraqi women paid a heavy price. They were squeezed between Saddam Hussein's tyranny and the harsh economic sanctions that directly affected their well-being, their families and their lives. They were the main vicims of the harsh reality visited on Iraq in the last 24 years. Iraqi society has become much more conservative, much more religious, much more self-enclosed and provincial than it used to be. There remains little of the old sophisticated Iraq, the capital of cultural production and Levantine capitalism.

The freedoms enjoyed by Iraqi women were sacrificed at the altar of economic and social dislocation. It will take awhile for Iraqi civil society, particularly women, to reemerge out of the rubble of political authoritarianism, the harsh economic sanctions and military occupation.

Bethesda, Md.: Mr. Gerges, thanks for taking the time to answer our questions. Any kind of democracy in Iraq will most likely elect a Shiite leader. Does that necessarily mean an anti-American posture long term?

If a Palesinian state is established as a result of U.S. pressure on Isreal, will this diffuse much of the hatred towards Americans by Arabs?

Fawaz Gerges: The Bush Administration has underestimated the religious fervor in Iraq. In their effort to sell the war to the American public and the world, Bush administration officials lost site of the political repercussions of the destruction of Iraqi institutions on Iraqi's future. If elections were to take place in Iraq today, religious conservative forces would win easily. These conservative forces tend to be anti-American and deeply suspicious of liberal values. But I think this is not a foregone conclusion. There are many shade sof opinion within the Shiite community and the struggle can evolve in a variety of ways depending on how the U.S. conducts its relations with Iraq in the next few weeks and months. The irony is that the U.S. could find itself faced with the prospect of an Islamic state in Iraq. The fear does not lie in just how this state would interact with the U.S. but in the political effects on internal stability in Iraq. There's a high risk that Iraq could fragment and descend into civil strife if an Islamic state was to materialize.

The simmering Palestinian tragedy is the most fundamental issue in how Arabs perceive their relationship with the western powers, particularly the U.S. Resolving the Palestinian issue would go a long way in reducing the state of tensions and grievances of Arabs and Muslims against the U.S. Not only does reaching a settlement between Palestinians and Israelis usher in a more stable regional order but it would also reduce anti-American sentiments throughout Arab lands. By helping to resolve the festering Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the U.S. would establish a more peaceful regional order and would minimize threats to its own vital interests. As a result, everyone wins.

washingtonpost.com:

That wraps up today's show. Thanks to everyone who joined the discussion.

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