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Philip H. Gordon, foreign policy studies senior fellow at The Brooking's Institution, was online to answer questions about Iraq, the war on terrorism and the international implications of a U.S. attack on Saddam.

The discussion is part of a regular series developed by Brooking's America's Response to Terrorism project and washingtonpost.com to examine the key policy questions related to the U.S. fight against terrorism.

The transcript follows.

Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.

Philip Gordon: I see we've got a very large number of questions on this important topic. I'll do my best to respond to as many as I can.

Herndon, Va.: Mr. Gordon --
One of the key elements discussed about a potential attack on Iraq is that many Iraqis will rush to support the US and help overthrow Saddam. While I don't doubt he is hated at home, wouldn't it make sense that the Iraqi people are also mad at us for getting their hopes up in 1991 and then letting them down in addition to the UN sanctions on Iraq?

Philip Gordon: The question of whether Iraqis will support Saddam or turn against him is one of the most important--and unpredicatable--variables in this equation. If Saddam's elite forces turn against him early the operation could be easy; if they fight hard it could be very costly. Since no one can know for sure how hard Iraqi forces will fight a US-led force (they surely hate Saddam, but they are afraid of him as well and might fight for that reason only), the US should not take the risk of sending in a small force and hoping the Iraqi opposition can do the job, but rather prepare to send in large forces, perhaps several hundred thousands. That's the best way to ensure that the Iraqi army will be certain of defeat; once it knows that it will be more likely to stop fighting and turn against Saddam.

Washington, D.C.: How does the U.S. plan to conciliate the divergent position of some of the European Allies on issues regarding Iraq? What reaction should we expect from the Europeans when/if the U.S. decides, by itself, to intervene militarily in Iraq?

Philip Gordon: It depends how we go about it and how we justify the attack. At present, with the exception of the UK government, Europeans are very skeptical about the need to attack Iraq. But they are sympathetic to the notion that Iraq must respect UN Security council resolutions and let arms inspectors back in. So I think that if Saddam continues to refuse inspectors, Europeans can be persuaded to support--or at least acquiesce--military action against Iraq. If the US decides to invade Iraq regardless of whether Saddam lets the inspectors back in, we'll have more of a problem. I would also add that while European support is not essential militarily for the operation--Turkey and Kuwait would be enough--it would be much better to have their diplomatic support, especially if we want them to get invovled in peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts afterwards (as in Afghanistan and in the Balkans).

Arlington, Va.: Forgive my cynicism, but it seems to me that the Iraq hawks have played up the need to "do something" in Iraq so skillfully that the idea has taken on a momentum of its own. So the administration now fears that if it doesn't "do something" it will look as if the U.S. backed down.

Philip Gordon: Yes, the hawks have played up the need to act, but I wouldn't underestimate the substance of their case either. Saddam is a dangerous dictator who is surely developing weapons of mass destruction, has used them against his own people and his neighbors, has attacked many of his neighbors (Iran, Kuwait, Israel, Saudi Arabia...) and obliges us to keep military forces in the region to contain him. Thus there is a sound case that the world would be a better place if Saddam were removed. That's not to say that doing so would be easy, however, and on this point I think the hawks have oversold their case. The American people need to understand that there are great risks and costs associated with changing the regime in Iraq; it might be worth running these risks, but they should not be ignored.

Lansing, Mich.: I've read about the dangers of backing Saddahm into a corner -- the idea that once we invade he'll having nothing to lose and no reason to hold back on using weapons of mass destruction. How likely is that to happen? How quickly can we take him out and finish the war?

Philip Gordon: The risk of a cornered Saddam Hussein using weapons of mass destruction is one of the greatest risks involved in regime change. We are reasonably sure that the only reason he did not use WMD during the first Gulf War was that he feared the threat of retaliation. But if our declared goal this time is to remove him from power or kill him, that constraint will be removed. He might get to the point where he felt his only option was to use WMD against us, his neighbors (like Israel), or even his own population, either to scare us away or to take down as many of his enemies with him as possible. What can we do about this? There are no guarantees, but we should make clear in advance that any Iraqi soldier that followed orders to use WMD would meet the most severe punishment possible. We would also want to get air cover over and troops in Western Iraq as soon as possible to stop WMD-armed Scuds from threatening Israel. Deploying missile defense systems like PAC-3 and Arrow to Iraq's neighbors would also be necessary. Finally, we could consider offering a cornered Saddam safe passage to refuge if he relinquished power without using WMD; this might seem repugnant to let him off the hook, but it would be better than facing a biological or chemical attack.

Bethesda, Md.: If the U.S. conquered Iraq, would the country stay together, or collapse into differing ethnic territories (Kurds to the North, Shiites in the South).

Isn't that a major concern for Turkey, who has a sizable Kurdish minority that's been trying to gain independance for years?

Philip Gordon: After the WMD threat, the threat of a destabilized Iraq is a major concern. The problem is that Iraq has for decades been governed by its Sunni minority, and if that minority is overthrown there is no guarantee that the Iraqi people (most of whom are Shia and many of whom are Kurds) will accept renewed Sunni leadership. I suspect the best we could hope for would be agreement on a decentralized Iraq with significant autonomy for the Kurds in the north and the Shia in the south, yet with an agreement on the territorial integrity of the country. Yes, the Turks are indeed worried about a possible break up of Iraq and its implications for Turkey's own unity. We will need to reassure them that we would not recognize an independent Kurdish state and that our goal is to keep Iraq together. Don't forget, the Kurds already for all intents and purposes are acting like a state in northern Iraq (under the PUK and the KDP), so getting rid of Saddam doesn't really change things there as much as is sometimes implied.

New York, N.Y.: Considering the various political and military factors involved, what is your estimate as to when a military attack against Iraq would begin? Also, do you believe an attack against Iraq is now in any way avoidable?

Philip Gordon: Obviously I have no special knowledge as to when a campaign might begin, and I don't think the administration itself knows. But my sense is that we're not talking about anything in the very near future--I think predictions of action this spring are probably premature for a number of reasons: we're still busy in Afghanistan (where special forces and intelligence assets are tied up); we need to replenish stocks of precision guided munitions; we need time to lay the diplomatic groundwork (show that Saddam is refusing weapons inspectors and calm the situations between Israelis and Palestinians); we need time to get significant forces deployed to the region; and I don't think we want to fight in the Iraqi desert during the summer. All this suggests to me that if there is to be action next fall would be a better time to begin it. (Unlike some others, I also don't see the urgent need for action; better to do it right).
Is action inevitable? It's hard to see how the Bush administration would not act after all that has been said. I don't really see Saddam changing his stripes any time soon. So I guess the only way to avoid an action is if there's a military coup in Iraq and Saddam is overthrown before our first shot is fired, or if he changes completely and lets weapons inspectors back in with no constraints (but I'd be surprised if he does that; he's more likely to try to play games with them).

Somewhere, USA: Under which International Law or UN Resolution, has the U.S. the right to declare war or at least plan to go on war with Iraq with the aim of overthrowing Sadam Hussein? It is not proved at all that Iraq was involved with attack on 11 September.

Philip Gordon: I think looking for a link between Saddam and September 11 is the wrong question. Some of the Iraq hawks have tried to demonstrate such a link as a pretext for getting Saddam and they have largely failed. But I don't think we need to make that link. The reason to get rid of Saddam is because he is a dictator that threatens his neighbors and is building weapons of mass destruction. I think regime-change would be very messy business, but if the alternative is waiting until he has nuclear weapons, and then having a confrontation, that looks even worse.
You ask about international law and UN resolutions. In fact it is Saddam Hussein who is refusing to abide by international law and UN resolutions. The UN Security Council was very clear after the Gulf War that Iraq had to abandon its WMD programs and that the judge of this would be the UN--not Iraq. Thus I do not think a new UNSCR would be needed to take action against Iraq. The condition of the Gulf War ceasefire was that Saddam would get rid of his WMD and he refuses to do that, so in a way military action would just be a continuation of that war.

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Why shouldn't the States win Saddam Hussein on its side and reach a lasting compromise with him? Despite all the rehtoric and hot exchanges of positions and hatred I think it justifies the trouble of attempt and save your country and the world all this ugly political situation.Instead of going away like Taliban I believe he will swallow all the pride and serve the new world order peacefully. You have Kaddafi as another example who crossed all the wrong journey to peace.

Philip Gordon: You have a lot more confidence than I do that Saddam can be dealt with peacefully. I wish you were right, but on what do you base the assessment that Saddam would swallow his pride and seek peace? He could have gotten rid of economic sanctions years ago, but instead has been willing to forego over $100 billion in oil revenues in order to continue his WMD programs. He runs a brutal police state and tortures and kills his political opponents. He invaded and pillaged Kuwait when he felt the Kuwaitis were not being supportive enough of Iraq. When his brother-in-law Hussein Kamel briefly defected to Jordan and then sought Saddam's forgiveness and returned to Iraq, Saddam had him killed. There not a lot to go on if you want to hope Saddam is willing to make amends and be friends.

Washington, D.C.: Do you think the United States would allow a Shi'ite government to take control of Iraq in a power vacuum in the event that Saddam is toppled?

Philip Gordon: As I've said, the potential for a post-Saddam power vacuum is indeed a serious risk. Given that the Shia are a majority in Iraq, they would certainly stake a claim to a major role in a new regime. I think the US would do what it could to prevent them from "taking control," but we need to accept the fact that removing Saddam will be opening a Pandora's Box, and there might not be any easy way to close it back up.

Arlington, Va.: Mr. Gordon,
You mentioned the important role of missile defense in any military operation designed to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Given the problems that Patriot faced ten years ago against conventional warheads, can our allies in the region be confident that PAC-3 and Arrow will provide a sufficient defense against WMD? The defenses are new and improved, but the ability to hit a ballistic missile only solves part of the problem. What goes up (like a warhead of VX) still must come down somewhere.

Philip Gordon: You're right. Our TMD systems are still far from perfect. But they are better than nothing. The Arrow, in fact, has has considerable success in testing. And its also true that even if you can intercept a warhead it will still fall to the ground somewhere, but it would still be far better to knock it away from a course toward the center of a city and have it fall in a less populated area. By hitting the warhead you might also be able to damage or destroy whatever CW or BW might be inside.

Washington, D.C.: When you speak of WMD -- what WMD's are you exactly talking about? Do you think that Iraq really has some weapons of mass destruction that could be more deadly than their conventional weapons? The emphasis on WMD seems to me, a bit of a red herring. Does he have delivery systems for these WMD's?

Philip Gordon: The problem is that we have no idea--that's why the absence of inspectors for three years is such a problem. We found out after the 1991 Gulf War that we had vastly underestimated his WMD potential--including in the nuclear area. I don't think he has nukes now, but who knows what he has--radiological "dirty bombs"? VX? anthrax? botulinium toxin? Yes, some CW and BW are hard to deliver, but we saw the damage that a tiny amount of anthrax did in the US. What would be the effect of VX warheads exploding over Tel-Aviv? What if Saddam used low flying kamikaze aircraft to deliver BW/CW against our troops, the Kurds, his own civilians, etc? I don't think these problems are insurmountable, but we'd be irresponsible not to take such a threat seriously.

Washington, D.C.: Good Afternoon Mr. Gordon,

Following any successful campaign to rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein (and subsequent "nation-building" exercise in that country,) do you think the United States will use Iraq's vast oil reserves to aggressively lean on Saudi Arabia to corral militant Islamics? And could Iraq supplant Saudi Arabia as the leading exporter of oil to the United States?

Philip Gordon: One of the advantages of regime-change in Iraq--provided we managed to set up a cooperative, stable government in place of the current regime--would be to lessen our dependence on Saudi oil. I'm not sure how aggressively we'd pressure the Saudis, but I do think that with secure oil supplied from a friendlier Iraq, we would no longer be so dependent on Saudi good will and we would be in a better position to push them on issues like funding for terrorist groups. It would also be good for Saudi Arabia, though; without the Iraqi threat, we might not need to keep bases on Saudi territory, which as we have seen is one cause of resentment in the region and one reason the Saudi government has felt it necessary to pursue the policies it has toward various Islamic groups.

Washington, D.C.: What is the chief threat Iraq poses to the U.S.? We hear about weapons of mass destruction all the time, so is that the whole story? Why is the Bush administration's stance more assertive compared to the previous administration? Is the threat to Israel and oil supplies more important to this administration? Thanks Mr. Gordon.

Philip Gordon: It's not a single threat but a dangerous cocktail of relentless pursuit of WMD; track record of invading neighbors; mistreatment of people; and potential links with international terrorism. That's what I think has given the Bush administration a sense of urgency (not the oil issue). People around Bush were already strongly anti-Saddam before September 11, but the terrorist acts of that day concentrated the mind, showing everyone just how dangerous certain enemies can be, and the subsequent anthrax attacks reminded us of the WMD threat. In that context, no one wants to contemplate what Saddam would do if left unchecked.

Philip Gordon: It looks like we're out of time. I appreciate all the questions and apologize to those whose questions I did not manage to get to. This is a serious issue and there are no easy answers.

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