James M. Lindsay

• Full Post Coverage • Brookings Institution Web Site • Talk: World News Message Boards • Live Online Transcripts • Subscribe to washingtonpost.com e-mail newsletters • mywashingtonpost. com -- customized news, traffic, weather and more

The Bush Trip: Missile Defense and Europe
With James M. Lindsay
Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Wednesday, June 13, 2001; 12 Noon EDT

James M. Lindsay, senior fellow in the foreign policy studies program at The Brookings Institution, will be online Wednesday, June 13, at 12 Noon EDT, to discuss the defense missile system with regard to the European Union.

Lindsay's main research interests are national missile defense and the domestic politics of foreign policy. He has authored, co-authored or edited ten books and more than 40 journal articles and book chapters on various aspects of American foreign policy and international relations. His books include "Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense" (with Michael O'Hanlon).

A transcript follows.

Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.

James M. Lindsay: Good day. I'm glad to join you online today. National missile defense is a critical policy issue and the decisions the United States makes on the subject will have enormous implications for it relations with the rest of the world.

College Park, Md.: Hello Mr Lindsay,

At the end of World War II, the Germans built thousands of V-2 rockets, which they launched at London and Antwerp. THAT WAS WITH 1940s TECHNOLOGY. Surely our current enemies could build just as many missiles. If those missiles were launched at once, wouldn't NMD be overwhelmed? If that's the case then how can the president claim that NMD would be a credible defense or deterrent?

The issue of deterrence is important. In 1940, German generals knew they could bypass the formidable Maginot Line by invading Belgium. The Maginot Line was not, therefore, a credible deterrent to them.

Unless it is proven to be effective against massed missiles and decoys, NMD won't be an effective deterrent either---just a waste of billions of dollars.

James M. Lindsay: You are quite right that defenses need to be effective to be worth deploying. That raises two questions. One how successful does a defense need to be to be judged effective? And how close are we technologically to building such a defense?

The answer to the first question depends on the size of the attack that you want to defend against. If the goal is to defend against a small attack, say the handful of missiles that a country like North Korea might be able to launch, even a defense that could shoot down only one out of two missiles might be worthwhile. But if the goal is to defend against an attack of several hundred warheads, which might be what happens in an accidential Russian launch, a fifty percent success rate wouldn't be sufficient.

As to where we stand now, the Pentagon has yet to demonstrate it can build a defense that can shoot down long-range missiles with any reliability. At a minimum, a working defense looks to be several years away.

As for the V-2s, those were short-range missiles that could carried very small payloads. Building an intercontinental missile capable of carrying a nuclear warheads is a far more daunting challenge.

Mt. Rainier: My feeling on the new missile defense is that it creates a self-fulfilling prophecy. By ignoring the root causes of violence and terrorism and simply building a wall (however imperfect) around the U.S., we pretty well ensure that violence and terrorism will increase. As a second to that, I am distressed that we have billions of dollars to sink into missiles that, God willing, we will never use. But we do not have enough money to ensure decent educations for all our kids, decent housing for the poor, and decent medical access. What will we be protecting in the long run but a hollow shell?

James M. Lindsay: Your second point raises the broadest of all questions--have we struck the proper balance between defense spending and other types of government spending? Unfortunately, it admits to no "correct" answer

As to your first point, it would be nice if the United States could solve the root causes of violence but I think it is well beyond our capabilities. And I doubt that building a missile defense will exacerbate terrorism.

What national missile defense might be able to do for Americans--if it can be made to work--is to provide them with an insurance policy, though perhaps imperfect, against an unlikely but potentially catastrophic event.

Rockville, Md.: From what I've read, one of the big challenges of missle defense is differentiating between missiles and balloon decoys traveling in space.

How will this challenge be solved?

James M. Lindsay: Decoys and countermeasures present a major challenge for any midcourse defense like the one that the Clinton administration proposed to build. (Midcourse defenses seek to shoot down individual warheads in space.) The Pentagon says that it is developing technology that will enable it to discriminate between decoys and the real thing. Many scientists outside the Pentagon doubt that this can be done. We will eventually see from Pentagon tests who is right on this score.

But keep in mind that midcourse defenses are not the only possible way to defend against ballistic missile attack. One approach that has gained in popularity in recent months, and that President Bush singled out in his May 1 speech, is boost-phase technology. Boost-phase defenses seek to shoot down enemy missiles early in their flight while their rocket motors are still burning. Not only are the missiles easy to locate at this point--they are essentially large burning gas tanks--but it is too early for them to dispense decoys or other countermeasures. So you are targeting the enemy missile at its most vulnerable stage.

Right now the Pentagon does not have a boost-phase interceptor program under development. That will almost certainly change soon. Then we will see if what sounds good in theory can be made to work in practice.

Washington, D.C.: How will NMD effect Asia, specifically China, India, and Pakistan?

James M. Lindsay: China adamantly opposes any U.S. NMD deployment. The reason is simple: Beijing fears the system is aimed at them. And with an arsenal of only 18 missiles capable of hitting U.S. soil, China is far more vulnerable to a U.S. NMD system than Russia is.

At a minimum, then, we can expect that a U.S. NMD deployment will prompt China to increase the size of its nuclear arsenal (which it may be preparing to do in any event). Whether China reacts more agressively, say by selling missile and nuclear technology to states hostile to the United States, will probably depend to a great extent on what it is that the United States deploys. And to greatly simplify matters, China will find a midcourse system along the lines that the Clinton administration proposed building far more threatening than an earth-based boost-phase interceptor.

As for South Asia, many NMD critics worry that an increase in the size of the Chinese nuclear force will have a ripple effect on India and Pakistan. The logic goes as follows: New Delhi might respond to the Chinese buildup with one of its own-and that in turn could convince Pakistan to build and deploy a larger arsenal than it otherwise might. In short, if Americans decide to protect themselves they could intensify an arms race among countries that are too close to the brink of war for comfort-not to mention too poor to afford an arms race without further impoverishing their own peoples.

These fears cannot be fully dismissed, but are probably overwrought. Even if China expands its arsenal more than it would otherwise in response to a U.S. NMD deployment, that may not affect India very much. China had a nuclear arsenal for more than three decades before India overtly pursued its own, suggesting that the linkage is indirect. More important, even its Hindu nationalist government, as well as most of its major schools of strategic thought, do not favor outright competition with China in the nuclear sphere. Most Indians wish to maintain a certain moral high ground in their nuclear posture, even if they have sacrificed much of it with their recent tests. In addition, India cannot easily afford an arms competition, and it is hard to see the potential utility of nuclear weapons in any future disputes with Beijing. The balance of forces in this Indian debate could change over time, but it would have to change quite a bit to make the numerical size of China's nuclear force decisive in New Delhi's nuclear force planning decisions. As for India's competition with Pakistan, the two have been aggressively developing ballistic missile technology in the absence of any U.S. missile defense system, and that competition is likely to persist regardless of what the United States decides on missile defense. In sum, a U.S. NMD deployment may drive up nuclear force levels in China and South Asia a bit, but it is unlikely to precipitate anything resembling a self-perpetuating arms race.

Ezekk, Dallas, Tex.: In your opinion, what countries, other than Russia and Communist China, have the capability to attack the U.S. with nuclear missiles?

James M. Lindsay: Four countries have the capability of attacking the United States with long-range nuclear missiles: Russia, China, Britain, and France. That's it. The fact that no one in Washington goes to sleep at night worried about a British or French attack highlights that what matters is intentions more than raw capabilities.

The debate now within the U.S. intelligence community is how far North Korea is away from being able to join the four countries above. Pyongyang has frozen its nuclear weapons program and is observing a moratorium on testing its long-range missiles. Most observers agree that if Pyongyang were to abandon these policies it could build a nuclear-tipped missile within years, if not months.

Dearborn, Mich.: Mr. Lindsay,

What are your thoughts on the Air Force's airborne laser and the Navy's proposals for a boost phase intercept?

Thank you very much.

James M. Lindsay: The airborne laser is an interesting techology. A chemical laser based on a modified 747 would shoot down enemy missiles during their boost-phase. The Air Force still has to demonstrate it can make the technology. Making a laser beam hold together as it passes through the atmosphere is no mean feat. Even if the Air Force succeeds, and it will be several years before we know, the airborne laser will never be a main line system for NMD. One reason is that it costs too much to keep the planes on continuous patrol. The other is that the ABL has to be within a couple hundred miles of its target and even then it is vulnerable to being shot down. So it would likely play a role after a war had begun and the U.S. Air Force had established air dominance. The problem is that by that time the adversary may already have fired its long-range missile.

As for sea-based boost-phase NMD, it shows great promise as a defense against a North Korean threat. Contrary to claims made by some NMD enthusiasts, the Navy is still years away from making such a system work. And when they do, sea-based boost-phase won't work against large of land-locked countries. (If a boost-phase interceptor is more than about 500 miles away from the enemy missile launch point, the enemy missile will complete its boost phase before the interceptor can arrive.)

Washington, D.C.: What is your opinion regarding the type of attack to which our nation is most vulnerable? I wonder whether we need to concentrate more on the ability to repel isolated acts of terrorism than on a missle defense shield. I feel like those attacks are most threatening because it is often difficult to pursue diplomatic options or even communicate with terrorist groups. On the other hand, the U.S. faces the possibility of attacks from aggressors with varying levels of sophisticaion. Perhaps the answer is to increase defense spending generally, in order to be able to respond effectively to different types of attacks.

James M. Lindsay: A wise defense policy would not fixate on a single threat but rather acknowledge that it needs to prepare for a wide variety of threats. And the U.S. government should approach NMD with this in mind. NMD is not a cure-all for everything that ails us. By the same token, the fact that other threats exist is not by itself reason not to defend against the long-range missile threat.

D.C.: If I remember correctly, it was either START or SALT I that set down the guidlines for missle defense. Aren't we only "allowed" to protect our capital city and 1 (or 2?) launching sites? How do we reconcile a NMD with this agreement? Also, a true or false for you based on an eralier question- Is China our biggest threat as of right now regarding a CONUS ballistic missle attack?

James M. Lindsay: The treaty you have in mind is the 1972 ABM Treaty. It originally limited the United States and the Soviet Union to no more than two missile defense sites, each equipped with no more than 100 missile interceptors. In 1974 the number was reduced to one site apiece.

Because the ABM Treaty prohibits the deployment of nationwide defenses, it would have to be modified, replaced, or abandoned before the United States could deploy an NMD system. President Bush is sending clear signals that the ABM Treaty's days are numbered. What, if anything, will replace it is unclear.

There's no reason to suppose that China poses a greater missile attack threat than Russia. True, we have major disagreements with Beijing over Taiwan, but we are long way away from the brink of armageddon. And the Russian arsenal, which dwarfs China's, is probably more vulnerable to an accidental launch.

Richmond, VA: The U.S. has been developing missle defense technologies for some time now. I believe Clinton's most recent decision was to continue development as opposed to deploying a non-functioning system.

What does it mean that Bush is pushing this as a priority? Spending levels? If so, what sort of spending could we expect to produce the minimum meaningful results. Does this fall within the 4% spending growth the administration has promised to enforce?

James M. Lindsay: As of today, we do not know what it is that President Bush plans to do. Although he has been emphatic that he wants to deploy missile defenses, he has not produced a plan for doing so. So we don't know what it is he wants to build, or how much he intends to spend, or when he wants the defense to be in place. Expect to see answers to these questions in the coming months.

Binghamton, N.Y.: From what I understood through the newspapers, the technology proposed as "shields" is far from being perfect. So, why does USA still want to go ahead, spending trillions of tax payer's money on a technology that no one can count on? Wouldn't it be wiser to do some more research and then induct the shields, given that there's no immediate threat from any nation?

James M. Lindsay: Why build defenses if they are not perfect? Two reasons. One, even an imperfect defense could save hundreds of thousands of lives in the event of a small attack, the only kind of attack that so-called rogue states might be able to must over the next decade. For example, assume that you had defense that worked half the time and that an adversary fired a missile at San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Portland. That defense would save two of those cities.

The other reason for building a defense is to lessen the chances that the United States will be subject to blackmail. It is actually this threat, not the threat of actual attack, that motivates many in the Bush administration. They fully understand that attacking the United States would be suicidal because we would launch a devastating retaliatory attack. Their concern is that countries that possess even a handful of missiles could use them to deter us from protecting our interests abroad. Or equally damaging, our allies might decide to appease the bad guys because they could not count on the United States, in the absence of a missile defense, to make good on its security commitments.

Lexington, Kentucky: Why is the dialogue about the technical feasibility of this proposed system so superficial? For example, what is the scientific likelihood that an AMD system can defeat decoys? Isn't the science of decoys far simpler than decoy identification? Also, why do we never hear about the "cost-benefit" analysis re: how much will this cost vs. the likelihood of any of these doomsday scenarios? Most of what we hear in these discussions are confined to simplistic cliches.

James M. Lindsay: With all due respect to the people hosting this online chat, the national news media are never good at delving into the details of any policy debate. And that's not really their job.

But the sort of questions that you raise do preoccupy the experts. There is a very vigorous debate going on all of them.

Washington D.C.: Dear sir,
Isn't the more realistic danger of attack either based in terrorist sources utilizing a portable first-strike device, like those we deployed around Europe during the Cold War? Does missle defense (while I am all for it) really address the realistic dangers of a strike against our Nation?

James M. Lindsay: A missile defense will not protect the United States from all kinds of attack. And it is not designed to. To argue that the United States should not protect itself against a missile strike because a bomb might be smuggled into New York harbor aboard a freighter is like arguing that we shouldn't protect ourselves against lung cancer because we could still get skin cancer.

The fact is that the United States should take prudent, emphasis prudent, steps to protect itself against a wide spectrum of threats. And keep in mind that the United States is not defenseless against terrorist attacks and suitcase bombs. Much of what the intelligence community, the FBI, the Customs Service, the Justice Department, and a host of other federal agencies do on a daily basis is to prevent such attacks. Do they deserve more resources to do this job? Probably so. We'll have to see what the Bush adminsitration proposes in the way of so-called homeland defense.

Reston, 20190: Mr. Lindsay, I've seen many people argue against BMD on the grounds that it
a. Is destabilizing and
b. Won't work.
My question: If it won't work, why is it destabilizing? Aren't those arguments somewhat contradictory?

James M. Lindsay: No, they are not necessarily contradictory, though at first glance they certainly seem to be. Here's why.

If we build a defense, potential adversaries, being prudent, will have to assume that it will work. (This is what defense planners, regardless of whether they are Chinese, Russian, or American.) They will take steps to protect themselves and/or if that's impossible, retaliate. We could interpret these responses are threatening, and so on.

By the same token, even if a defense works, it might not be destabilizing. It all depends on whether major countries like Russia and China find it threatening. For more on this, check out the book that Michael O'Hanlon and I just wrote, Defending America.

New York, N.Y.: Can the U.S. proceed with research into a missile defense without the support of Europe and/or Russia? Should we without that support?

James M. Lindsay: Yes, the United States can build a missile defense system without European and Russian support. And the United States should never give other countries a right to veto policies it believes to be in its best interests. But it would certainly be better for U.S. alliance relations and for global stability if it could proceed with missile defense in cooperation with the Europeans and the Russians.

James M. Lindsay: I want to thank everyone who submitted questions, and I apologize to those of you who I didn't get a chance to answer. (I am not the world's fastest typist.) You can find answers to the many of the questions you raise in the book that Michael O'Hanlon and I just wrote, Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense (Brookings Institution Press, 20010). God bless.

   |       |