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America Attacked:
Diplomatic Relations
With Dr. Timothy Hoyt
Research Fellow,
Center for Peace and Security Studies,
Georgetown University
Tuesday, Oct. 16, 2001; 11 a.m. EDT
Monday, Secretary of State Colin Powell arrived in Pakistan for discussions with leaders about the future of Afghanistan. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has made it clear his government is no longer wedded to Afghanistan's ruling Taliban, but has shown concern over any possibility of the Northern Alliance taking the Taliban's place in Kabul. Powell will also visit India and China while in the region.
Dr. Timothy Hoyt, research fellow at the Center for Peace and Security Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Services at Georgetown University, will be online Tuesday, Oct. 16 at Noon EDT, to discuss the role of diplomacy in Afghanistan's future, the region's stabilility and what Secretary of State Powell can hope to accomplish on this trip.
Hoyt has designed and coordinated political-military simulations for universities, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. He has worked for the U.S. Army, the U.S. Department of State, and as a researcher on defense issues for the Library of Congress. He has written on a variety of subjects, including the diffusion of military technologies and practices, the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons, regional security in the Middle East and South Asia, and the evolution of strategy and arms production in the developing world.
A transcript follows.
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Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Good morning. It's nice to be back on Washingtonpost.com. Secretary of State Powell is currently in South Asia, trying to maintain support for the coalition and for our air operations against Afghanistan. At the same time, he is also trying to ensure that India and Pakistan both feel secure against one another and comfortable with an extensive US involvement in the region. This has been made more difficult by terrorist attacks on the Srinigar assembly in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir at the beginning of the month and Indian artillery fire across the border into Pakistani territory yesterday in response to reported incursions.
I've pre-typed answers to the questions that came in before 1030 this morning, and will do my best to answer all the other questions that come in between 1100 and 1200. Have patience with my typing, please, and I'll try to answer everyone. Thanks!
Mumbai, India:
Do you think Pakistan has turned round the corner and is now serious in curbing terrorists within it's own territory given that ISI is known to have close links with terrorist outfits operating from Pakistan? Can, one man, President Musharaff, survive this crisis, first from his own Islamist colleagues and later from the Pakistani masses?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Mumbai
I don't think Pakistan has completely turned over a new leaf. Kashmir remains a focal point in Pakistani foreign policy, and remains an obsession with some elements of the military leadership (which plays a large role in Pakistani foreign policy). General Musharraf has been placed in a difficult position - the price of not cooperating with the US was too high, but one of the results is that Pakistan must temporarily (at a minimum) dial back overt support for groups that operate in Kashmir.
This isn't easy. Many of these groups - particularly Harkat ul-Mujaheddin, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammed (different speelings exist) - are Islamic extremist groups who train in Afghanistan and have strong links to Taliban. The U.S. initially only put HuM under financial sanctions - even though Lashkar and JeM are both on the State Dept. terrorist list for 2000! Presumably, the US was trying to accommodate Musharraf's internal difficulties - an act that was made much more difficult when Jaish claimed credit for the bombing of the assembly in Srinigar at the beginning of this month, which forced the US to put them on the list as well.
Pakistan has been using Islamic extremist groups, and large numbers of foreign volunteers, to keep Kashmir inflamed (although many of the insurgents there are Kashmiri, and the initial uprising was primarily indigenous). This ties up Indian military forces and keeps the issue in the eye of the international media. It is possible that Pakistan will use this opportunity, under General Musharraf's leadership, to crack down on Islamist political parties, madrassahs, and militant groups. These elements not only engage in terrorism in Kashmir and elsewhere, but also threaten Pakistani domestic political stability - something Musharraf has pledged to restore.
This would constitute a major shift in Pakistani policy, and would involve considerable risk. Cracking down on Islamic elements may have high costs, and conspicuously undermining support for the ongoing struggle in Kashmir would alienate important elements in both the Army and Pakistani society. I am fairly sure, given the likelihood of an ongoing US presence in the region for several years, that Gen. Musharraf could attempt this. But the risks would be very high, and the benefits would have to be commensurate - some form of negotiated deal on Kashmir that could be viewed as a success in Pakistani eyes, significant economic assistance, and perhaps other enticements of various kinds. There are elements in Pakistani society and even the Army that would be willing to work towards such a settlement, which would fundamentally change South Asia's political climate. But the risks are extraordinarily high, and the political climate far from optimal for radical change. I am not optimistic, although I do suspect that there will be a significant drop in covert Pakistani support for the conflict in Kashmir in the near term.
Washington, D.C.:
Will General Musharref turn into another U.S. sponsored dictator at the expense of the people of Pakistan after this war is concluded like so many of our supposed allies? (Mubarak, the Saudi royal family, Saddam, Marcos, DuVallier)
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Washington, DC
I think the sentiment from most South Asian specialists in the US and abroad (even in India, to some extent) is - "If not Musharraf, then what?" Paksitan's democratic experiment in the late 1980s and early 1990s proved unsuccessful, because of corruption in both major parties and the dominant role of the Pakistani military in key areas of policy. Musharraf has declared that he will restore Pakistani democracy, and that he will also reinvigorate it and move it away from corrupt factionalism.
So far, his efforts have been modest, and only modestly successful. His efforts to reform the Pakistani economy have been more successful, although it is still in dire straits without significant international assistance. But it is unclear what the real alternatives are to military rule - the worst case is internal chaos or a more radical Islamic regime, both of which are unattractive to the US and the international system.
But the real answer to your question lies more with Musharraf than with the US. He will, ultimately, make some key decisions about the future of Pakistan. His decision to extend his tenure as Chief of the Pakistani military suggests that he intends to remain in power longer, and to ensure that he retains formal authority over uniformed officers (several of whom he then reassigned or forced into retirement). He is in a position to accomplish lasting change of historical significance, but may not be willing to take the risks associated with it.
After this war, however, I'd say either Musharraf is in power, or another general is in power, or Pakistan is suffering from internal chaos. None of those are appealing alternatives, but from a US perspective, Musharraf may be preferable.
The Netherlands:
Sir,
To many of us it appears that American government has overestimated the help Pakistan can give against terrorism, overestimated the dangers of instability in that country and underestimated the dangers that a dictator with nuclaer weapons could pose to the region and the world. History shows that America has appeased dictators in the past for short term gains and created wider problems down the line. Are there no dissenting voices in USA?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Netherlands
The US may have made some bad estimates, but the alternatives may be either worse or quite limited. Pakistan's nuclear program has been developed under both military and civilian governments - many analysts argue that Pakistani behavior is in fact more stable under military rule than otherwise, although I think that's a question that's worth debating.
We may have overestimated the ability of Pakistan to help with terrorism - but like it or not, ISI (Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence) has been working with the Taliban for years, and has better information on it than anyone else. That's a resource the US needs to prosecute this first stage of the war. Pakistan may not be unstable - in fact, I believe the risk of a radical Islamic revolt is quite low - but the US needs Pakistani cooperation to operate against Afghanistan, and must be sensitive to the potential domestic response (which already appears to be increasingly anti-American, putting some mild pressure on the Musharraf regime).
And to be more Machiavellian for a moment, if the real fear is dictators with nuclear weapons, one could make a reasonable case that the best solution to that problem is to be located in country, where we can monitor Pakistani movements more carefully and exert more influence over nuclear decisions.
There are some dissenting voices in America - although not too many. There are a lot of concerned voices in America, both inside and outside the administration. The new US-Pakistani relationship is fundamentally different from, for instance, the rapprochement after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This is much more sober, measured, and careful. I do not anticipate large military aid packages, for example, and the improving US relationship with India will constrain American commitment to Pakistan in many areas.
Alexandria, Va.:
Is there a difference between "understanding" the terrorists who attacked us and appeasing the terrorists who attacked us?
If the U.S. says that in the future it will show increased understanding for people who attack U.S. civilians then terrorists will be lining up to attack us.
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Alexandria, VA
Yes, there's a difference.
If I appease a terrorist, I give them basically what they want in hopes that they'll behave better. Since Al Qaeda wants, in order of importance, the withdrawal of the US from the Persian Gulf and Islam's holy places, the destruction of Israel, and the elimination of Western culture, I don't think appeasement is either productive or in fact possible.
If I understand a terrorist, I know what motivates them. That means not only can I begin, with some accuracy, to predict their possible actions in the future, but I also know ways in which I can hurt them. That means I may be able, over time, to defeat them - either by denying them success while gradually destroying their forces, or by confronting and resolving the issues which provide them with public, state, and economic support.
At some point down the line, understanding also may be necessary to negotiate an end to conflict. That's something we may not be able to do with al Qaeda, but it may be important to do with other terrorist groups. We know that many Islamic groups focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A political solution to that problem, accepted not only by both parties but also by the political leadership of the Arab world, is possible, and was almost achieved in the late 1990s. Should that issue be resolved, it will drain away much of the rationale for Islamic terrorism - not ending it completely, by any means, but certainly decreasing their pool of potential recruits and their ability to operate freely in the Middle East and elsewhere. In South Asia, a political settlement to the Kashmir problem would fundamentally change the terrorist threat there, as well.
Finally, understanding terrorist groups allows you to prioritize them as threats and problems. Al Qaeda is clearly a very difficult problem, since it is transnational in nature, has support from several states, and has independent financial resources. This makes it the first priority. Other terrorist groups may not be as difficult to locate (they may have fixed territorial locations, for example) and may also not be as capable of mounting major threats to the US.
Sun Tzu, 2500 years ago, said "Know yourself, and know your enemy, and you shall win a hundred battles." That's still pretty good advice.
Raleigh, N.C.:
Dr. Hoyt,
With friends like these, who needs enemies?
It's no secret that the Saudis blocked our FBI investigation into Khobar bombings. The Yemenese government blocked investigations into USS Cole bombings. President Musharraf canned the CIA commando strategy to nab Osama. Yet, here we are wooing them into a marriage of convenience all over again. Won't we ever learn? It was opportunistic and unprincipled alliances with totalitarian regimes like the ones in Saudi Arabia and dictator of the day regimes like the ones in Pakistan that brought us this current tragic situation. A man is known by the company he keeps. So is a nation.
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Raleigh, NC
We're stuck between a rock and a hard place. Al Qaeda has declared war on the US, and has killed roughly 6000 of our citizens - mostly civilians. We are currently under an extended biological warfare attack from unknown sources - or at least that is my own interpretation of the rash of anthrax attacks in the United States.
If we don't work with these Arab regimes, who are not eager partners in many cases, how are we going to wage this conflict? How are we going to win? Al Qaeda has support in most Arab states and many others, including large cells in the US and Europe. To crack that network, we need help from intelligence agencies in the Arab world, even if they're not willing to give us complete commitment and assistance.
In some respects, it's even worse than you state. We will have to work with people with even dirtier hands than the states you name - Egypt, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia (and at least Egypt and Saudi Arabia have a history of some cooperation with the US, including the Gulf War). We're probably going to have to work with the Syrians and Iranians, who have supported terrorist attacks against us.
Realistically, what are our alternatives? We could attempt to impose democracy throughout the Middle East and Persian Gulf, so that we could work with better regimes. But that would play right into Al Qaeda's hands, proving that the conflict is really a war between the West and Islam. It probably also would not be easily accomplished, and might actually have adverse results, since some of the most organized political elements in many Arab states are radical Islamic factions.
Should we, could we, have accomplished some of this in the past? Perhaps. But the risks were great. At least 20 years of US support has brought a temporary respite between Israel and Egypt - an important accomplishment, given their earlier history. And the government remains quite fragile, and threatened by radical Islamic elements itself. The Saudi monarchy is certainly no democracy, and faces internal challenges as well. Finally, it's worth remembering that the US constantly walks a foreign policy tightrope in this part of the world because of our relationship with Israel. Because of our legitimate unwillingness to abandon Israel, we have to cooperate with Arab regimes, however undemocratic, that are willing to at least consider the legitimacy of Israel over time. In that respect, the Mubaraks and Saudi monarchs are far preferable to the old Grand Mufti of Jerusalem or Saddam.
At the end of the day, we cooperate with these regimes because the alternatives are worse. That's not inherently satisfying, or particularly idealistic. But under the circumstances, it probably falls into the category of "greater good."
Mt. Lebanon, Pa.:
When in the Afghanistan peace and prosperity computer scenario will the warriors yield to the policy wonk types, that is what are the specific accomplishments that have to be achieved before the hot air merchants start to run the show? And what will be the name of the winner of the Keys to Kabul contest - Joint Coalition Committee, Northern Alliance guy, Pakistan pal, Afghan royal type, General Somebody, Other? Thanks much.
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Wow - unabashed cynicism < grin > .
I think you're looking at some kind of colaition solution. The US is clearly trying to delay a full-fledged support of the Northern Alliance, for several reasons. First, remember that that Northern Alliance were the folks who were in charge of Afghanistan _before_ the Taliban - and the Taliban was supported by many as a preferable alternative. Second, Pakistan really doesn't want the Northern Alliance in charge (since they created the Taliban, they might be worried about the ramificaitons). Third, the Northern Alliance represent only a couple of the ethnic minorities in Afghanistan - the US and international community would prefer a more representative government.
I think you'll see some kind of multi-ethnic coalition, perhaps with the King or a family member as a symbolic head. I also suspect you'll see substantial UN involvement - the US won't want to spend much time in a peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan.
As for when the policy wonk types get to play - I think they're already working on it. It's important to be fair toe the Bush administration - they are coordinating political, economic, military, and psychological responses to this crisis with great restraint and cleverness. The military action against Afghanistan is quite limited in comparison to what we're capable of doing - we flew over 2300 aircraft sorties and over 800 strike mission the first night of the Gulf War, and we're not even remotely close to that in Afghanistan after more than a week of bombing. We're being very careful about targets (as careful as you can be in a war), and are trying to simultaneously feed the Afghani population and destroy the Taliban rgime.
That sounds pretty wonky, in some respects, to me. < grin >
Mt. Rainier, Md.:
Like Pakistan's Musharref, I am very concerned about the Northern Alliance -- though probably not for the same reasons! This is the same coalition that, having chased the USSR out, broke into internecine warfare among themselves and developed a reputation for violence and rape worse than the Taliban. Many Afghans were hoping the Taliban would save them from the depredations of the Northern Alliance. Beyond a weak old man, the shah, who does this leave that could put together a responsible government in Afghanistan?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: See above response. You're right - the NOrthern Alliance has dirty hands, and at one point the Taliban was viewed as preferable.
I suspect the solution is some kind of ethnic powersharing and substantial UN involvement over an extended period, while the economy and civil society are rebuilt. This won't be easy. It's probably better done by the UN than by the US or the World Bank, however - the latter two would just play into the "West versus Islam" stereotype that Al Qaeda and others want to perpetuate.
Northern Alliance will have some role in the future government - I think that's unavoidable. But it will, I hope, be tempered substantially by other elements.
London:
"Too many cooks spoil the broth." How do you see that such a broad-based alliance as we've been hearing about,one that includes the Northern Alliance, the Pashtuns, the Tribal leaders, the Talibans and so on, can work amicably and for how long? There is bound to be a conflict of interests.
Thank you
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Again, I think we're looking at an extended and extensive rebuilding of the Afghan economy and civil society. It's possible that under either UN leadership or the symbolic leadership of the monarchy, that you could create (for example) a more federalist Afghanistan with substantial local autonomy in the various ethnic regions.
I'm afraid I don't have an assured solution to the problem, however. I wish I did. This is a part of the world that has been brutalized for 20 years, and where the US (in particular) has neglected our responsibilities to those who fought and defeated the Soviet Union with our assistance.
Minneapolis, Minn.:
Secretary Powell's statement in Islamabad seemed at odds with the Pakistani President's statement. Almost as if rebuffing Musharraf, Powell said the bombing would continue till "the operation's goal was achieved" (Musharraf has been saying Pakistan wants it to be over soon). This along with Condoleeza Rice's statement on Sunday that "there is no good terrorism or bad terrorism; terrorism is bad" seems to imply a (slight) shift in U.S. policy toward Pakistan's approach to Kashmir. Comments?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: I think we're hedging right now. The US needs Pakistan - period. But it does not want to get sucked into supporting Pakistan's support for the Kashmir conflict. We've already hedged a little bit with Russia (the Chechens have become terrorists), and to some extent with Pakistan (not all the Radical Islamists supporting Kashmir are under financial sanctions).
The declaration that the bombing will go on until the operational goals are achieved is a gentle diplomatic disagreement. Given the increased unrest in Pakistan, Gen. Musharraf has to act as though the conflict will be over soon, but Sec. Powell was simply indicating that US operations will not be constrained at the whim of Pakistan.
Our definition of terrorism remains broad, but very flexible. The US wants all terrorist groups to be on notice (and all the states that support terrorist groups), but isn't wiling to engage them all simultaneously - it's costly, and impractical (among other things). It also could change the nature of this conflict, which we're trying very hard to limit in the initial stages.
I think you'll continue to see statements like that coming from leading US officials. I also think you'll continue to see the US gently asserting its own position on South Asia, occasionally in contradiction to statements by Gen. Musharraf. The Paksitanis, for instance , want support from the US on Kashmir. US policy, since the 1990s if not earlier, has increasingly hardened around the idea of acceptance of the Line of Control as the international border. This is not amenable to many Pakistanis, and while the US would certainly accept some other solution if both sides negotiated it in good faith, I think in the absence of negotiations Pakistan may be hoping for more support over Kashmir than they can actually expect.
Taylorville Ill.:
Has our actions in the region actually inflamed the ongoing problems between India and Pakistan and could either of these countries use the current situation to their military advantage?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: I don't think our presence has inflamed the situation. Cross-border artillery fire has been a staple of Indo-Pakistani relations for over a decade - in this case, it is just the timing that makes it particularly newsworthy.
India and Pakistan fought a war in 1947-48, had a major border clash in 1965, and then another war that year, and then a major war in 1971. Since then, they've had nuclear-related political crises on at least two occasions (including Brasstacks) in the 1980s, another in 1990, tit-for-tat nuclear tests in 1998, and a small war in Kargil in 1999. Plus, of course, an on-going low-intensity engagement over Siachen Glacier since the 1980s. In short, they have plenty of history of conflict without us there. Pakistan aids and abets Kashmiri separatists in their ongoing war against India, which has killed tens of thousands of people in the last decade.
Can either country use this to their advantage? Perhaps, but at some risk. Pakistan may feel more secure against possible INdian aggression since American forces are now stationed in their country. That could provide them with sa sense that they can take advantage of that support, encouraging greater inflitration into Kashmir (which also would get Islamic extremists out of Pakistan, where they threaten domestic stability and might annoy the US). That's one scenario for Pakistan taking advantage. There are also some Indians talking about the possibility of using this opportunity, where the US is beginning a war against terrorism, to expand their operations either against separatists in Kashmir (which would be in their own territory) or to use "hot pursuit" rules of engagement to enter Pakistani territory if separatists flee across the border or line of control. The latter would, surely, cause the US great concern - but I cannot begin to predict what our response would be.
So the current crisis offers new challenges and opportunities to both sides, which is one reason Sec. Powell has gone to try to reassure both sides and assert the US interest in a less volatile border.
Mt. Rainier, Md.:
I see some newspaper accounts talking about 'moderates' within the Taliban being willing to give up bin Laden. I wonder what kind of moderation these men practice, and would it include education and rights for women, or is that immoderate? The Taliban has been very big on its religious/cultural rights, but I notice it's quite willing to abrogate rights of the non-Pashto non-fundamentalist non-male people within Afghanistan.
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: I'm afraid I don't know exactly who the newspaper are talking about. The image of fleeing a sinking ship comes to mind - faced with real trouble, it is startling how pragmatic people can suddenly become.
It's also important to remember that the majority of the Taliban are foreigners. It may be that the Afghan component of the Taliban might be willing to come to some accomodation with the rest of their country that foreign elements, for religious or ideological reasons, find unacceptable.
San Francisco, Calif.:
What can the U.S. government do to increase the support of the people of Pakistan for the war against terrorism in Afghanistan? Are there ways that we could more effectively explain our point of view to the people of Pakistan? How can the U.S. be more helpful to the government of Pakistan which is supporting our fight against terrorism?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Let me start with the last point first. We're providing substantial economic assistance and basically reopening full diplomatic contacts with Pakistan, which is a very significant change. Pakistan was under sanctions from 1990, 1998, and 1999 (for its nuclear capability, nuclear tests, and military coup). Most of those sanctions are now lifted or in the process of being lifted, and some military ties may be restored as well. These are substantial gestures, given the dire state of Pakistan's economy.
We _do_ desperately need to better explain our efforts not just to the Pakistani people but to the Muslim world as a whole. As a result, the administration has discovered the importance of public diplomacy - something Republicans frequently condemned in Democratic administrations. We also need to emphasize both our humanitarian efforts _and_ the limited nature of the air campaign.
I think that's just the tip of the iceberg, though. A big part of the problem is that many Muslims don't have access to anything beyond state-controlled media. I'd make better use of Al Jazeera (the independent news service in the Gulf which has raised such controversy) and start to find other means of communicating with Muslim public opinion.
McLean, Va.:
Does the U.S.'s turn-around on Pakistan not send the unmistakeable message -- terrorism pays (like it apparently is for a regime that spawned the Taleban, but is now a key ally after it's client committed a grave act of terror in New York)?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: I don't think so from our own perspective - Pakistani terrorism has, so far, not really affected the US. From other perspectives (say, India, which is quite concerned about this), it might send that message.
This is the opening stage of a longer conflict. Pakistan is necessary to wage this part of the campaign, both for its bases and its intelligence assets. The worst case is just as you say - that Pakistan feels it has been rewarded for terrorism. The best case is that the US presence in Pakistan gives Gen. Musharraf the opportunity and ability to carry out genuine reforms which change the region. The truth is probably somewhere in between.
But I strongly suspect that as the Afghan situation resolves (and I would not encourage anyone to to bet on the Taliban), there will be more pressure from the US over Pakistan's support for Islamic extremists.
Washington, D.C.:
What about the role of Iran? Are they anti-Taleban but won't help the U.S.? And did Israel side with Iran against Iraq in the 1980s Eight Years War?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Lots of interesting people gave help to Iran - Israel, and also the US (remember Iran-Contra?).
We are not receiving official cooperation from Iran at this time. I'm sure we have unofficial contacts with Iran, either through intelligence or through third parties like France. Iran supports the Northern Alliance and other opposition groups.
Again, it's possible that one outcome of this crisis is an acceleration of a slow drift towards better US-Iranian relations that has been occuring over the last few years. But I would not look for substantial overt cooperation anytime soon.
Chicago, Ill.:
In the fight against terrorism, it is necessary to strengthen moderate forces. Should the U.S. not use its influence and weight to resolve the long festering Kashmir dispute which to a large extent fuels extremism in Pakistan? Left to their own devices, India and Pakistan will never resolve this issue.
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: There are limits to what we can do to resolve Kashmir. We have even less leverage than we do over Israel-Palestine.
We can offer to act as an honest broker, but both sides have reason to distrust us for our behavior in the region in the past (India thinks we abandoned them in 1965, and Pakistan _knows_ we abandoned them in both 1965 and 1990). On the other hand, there is probably no other real honest broker that can provide significant assurances in the long run. So we could act, perhaps, as a mediator.
Our history in South Asia is checkered at best - when we have intervened dynamically, we have tended to alienate both sides. this is a very delicate issue, and one that the two states need to resolve by themselves, for the most part. We can continue to offer our services in a variety of ways, and it may be that our expanded presence in the region will offer an umbrella for more productinve negotiations in the future. But it's worth remembering that the Agra summit was not successful earlier this year, and that the much heralded Lahore meeting in 1999 occurred at the same time that Pakistan was preparing a (limited) invasion of India in Kargil.
This is a tough issue, that the US cannot solve for them or really coerce either state into accepting a solution.
Arlington, Va.:
Do you know if Pakistani nuclear weapons, which ostensibly were developed to drop on India, can reach the U.S. if fired by Taleban?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: The conventional systems for nuclear delivery (missiles and planes) are lacking, at least for Taliban. They do have venerable SCUD missiles (less capable than the ones Iraq used in the Gulf War), but these have very short ranges. MOst of Afghanistan's aircraft are now wrecked, and they have no long-range bombers of any kind.
Unconventional delivery systems are another problem - the US spends a lot of time worrying about nuclear terrorism.
The key question is whether Taliban can get hold of Pakistan's nuclear weapons somehow. There have been a number of press reports of US discussions with Pakistan on nuclear security since the beginning of the Sept. 11 crisis, so I think we are being quite careful about this possibility.
Colorado Springs, Colo.:
Sir,
Do you think that the U.S. will lose interest in Pakistan once this campain is over and is it in U.S. interest to help Pakistan on Kashmir?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: I do not think the US will support Pakistan's claim to all of Kashmir. It may support a negotiated settlement that both India and Pakistan agree to, which could be accepting the current Line of Control as the border or (if India makes concessions) might cede part or all of the Vale of Kashmir to Pakistan.
I think the US position on th latter would be something along the lines of "We won't tell India to do that, but if they agree to it it's fine with us."
That's probably not as much support on Kashmir as most Pakistanis would like. But even before Kargil, the US position was hardening around the LoC/border as a solution to a difficult problem, and I do not think the US will tilt substantially towards a more pro-Pakistani solution. But that's just my guess.
Arlington, Va.:
Does anyone (besides the Israelis) in the Middle East actually believe in democracy?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: The short answer is "yes." There are lots of middle class, educated Muslims who think democracy, or some variation on it, is a good idea. In terms of governments, however, most Arab states remain concerned about how much input their publics should have in government. There are lots of reasons for this (tradition, culture, history, elite preference) and some we might not think of - in the Persian Gulf, for instance, many of the smaller states have huge immigrant populations of nationals from other countries.
Alexandria, Va.:
Pakistan is far away from Israel and (as far as I know) has never had a significant Jewish population. Yet its populace seems obsessed with a toxic anti-Semitism. Where does this come from?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Sadly, extremist Islam focuses on Israel as a rallying cry. Even moderate Islamic elements use vitriolic language and expressions against Israel - and a glance at newspapers in Egypt, for instance, would horrify most Americans due to the vicious anti-Semitic cartoons and articles that frequently appear there.
Israel, sadly, has provided a crucial element in the rise of both Arab nationalism and extremist Islam - not necessarily because of its actions (although some have been questionable) but simply because of its existence.
McLean, Va.:
Granted that our coalition partners will likely have
a say, which country is likely to come under U.S.
guns once we're finished with Afghanistan?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: There's a lot of debate about expanding the conflict to IRaq, but that appears to have been put on hold for the moment. Some areas of concern in the press have included Sudan, the Phillipines, Malaysia, and Indonesia - all places where the Bin Laden network has deep roots.
I'm not sure how much we would use the military in those places, however - we may prefer to cooperate with the governments and do more police-type work.
Bangalore, India:
The U.S. has repeatedly tried to reassure India by saying that this is just phase one of the campaign. Later phases will(may) encompass terrorism in J&K.
The U.S. and U.K. recently placed the Jaish on the terrorist list. Yet it's leader Mazoor freely lives in Pakistan with possibly state protection. Why isn't the US pressing for his arrest ? Was J-e-M placed on the list just to pacify India or is the U.S. serious about it's fight towards terrorism ? Shouldn't the "result-oriented" President Bush ask Pakistan to show some results in this regard? Pakistan claims it has taken a "principled stand" in the fight against terrorism.
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: The fact that JeM got put on the terrorist list indicates an admittedly belated US response to India's concerns.
I think major pressure on Pakistan will not take place nearly quickly enough to reassure India. But the fact that it is coming slowly suggests that the US is at least responsive to some Indian concerns, and attempting to be both principled and pragmatic at the same time (a real problem for most states).
Pakistan is particularly necessary for an Afghan campaign. After that ends, there may be a shift in the US approach to Pakistan on other groups. In the meantime, I'd expect that pressure to be slower and more subtle than many Indians will be comfortable with - but it is considerably more than the US was doing in this area before, which may be some consolation.
Arlington, Va.:
Dr. Hoyt,
In your class, you refered to strong U.S. involvement in the region due to the wealth of resources in the Middle East. It looks like the two biggest interests for the U.S. are oil and Israel. It seems that the region does not appreciate our involvement in the area. How would you suggest the U.S. approach both issues? Show we scale back our Mid-East involvement by developing alternative fuels and slowly removing our support for Israel and let the region "fight it out?" Or should we strengthen our commitment by reaffirming our support for Israel and play a role in developing the Middle East?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Uh oh. Caught by a student < grin > .
I think alternative fuels is a great idea, although I'm not a big fan of nuclear energy (that lecture will have to wait for another day < grin > ).
I think abandoning Israel is unacceptable to most Americans. Israel was established because of a Holocaust, and abandoning it virtually ensures another one.
I think playing a role in the development of the Middle East is a great idea, but it is contingent to a great extent on the MidEast peace process. That's something we probably can't accelerate any more than we've already tried, but we do have to keep pushing. I'd also try to raise the awareness of the Muslim population that the US is not simply a bogeyman, and that it has on several occasions supported Muslims from attacks by others.
Chicago, Ill.:
"Those who forget history are condemned to repeat it" -- so goes the saying. Do you believe that U.S. is following on the same past foreign policy measures. The allies that are drummed up are all undemocratic, supportive of violence and theocratic regimes. Its like COLD WAR again?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Again, who do you work with? Yes, many of these regimes aren't ones we would want to live in. On the other hand, if we don't work with them, we raise the likelihood that groups like Al Qaeda can carry out attacks like Sept. 11 again in the future, in both the US and abroad.
Personally, I find that unacceptable, and think we need to work with people with dirty hands to fix the problem. OTOH, we can also take a longer range view and more vigorously encourage these regimes to reform and change themselves.
washingtonpost.com:
Dr. Hoyt. How would you describe Colin Powell? Is he currently a general in diplomat's clothing, or was he a diplomat in general's uniform when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: I think Gen. Powell was a very political general - a natural outcome of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and its effort to reform US national security policy. At the highest levels of the military, you need to have people who can provide military counsel to the President while remaining aware of the political objectives the US is trying to achieve. Gen. Powell was quite successful at this, although we continue to debate the results of the Gulf War. As Sec. State, he is certainly playing his role, but I think his awareness of the effectiveness and limitations of US military instruments enhances his effectiveness.
Washington, D.C.:
If I remember correctly there is a U.N. resolution on Kashmir to allow the people of Kashmir to have a plebisite to join either Pakistan or India, so why doesn't the U.S. exert pressure pressure on India to let the people of Kashmir decide about their fate?
Why is the policy different in case of Kashimir?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: That plebiscite would require both states to withdraw their troops from both parts of Kashmir - something neither side has been willing to do (and which would have bloody results on the Indian side of the border right now due to the conflict). In addition, Pakistan ceded a significant part of northernmost Kashmir to China in the early 1960s, so you have a third player in the equation.
It's a very thorny problem, and the UN resolution probably no longer offers a solution.
Albany, N.Y.:
What if (and its a very important if), the U.S. bombing of Taliban goes on for substantial time and neither Taliban nor Osama buckle under it?
Knowing the uprising in Pakistan against Musharraf's decision to back the U.S. (though claimed to be in minority), what do you think of the tight rope that Musharraf is walking on and how long could he walk? He's hoping for a shorter campaign but what if it turns out to be a long one?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Musharraf will face a difficult choice if the campaign drags on - either crack down on extremist Islam (something the Army was unwilling to do earlier in the year) or face increasing unrest. That's a tough choice. I think there's an opportunity to crack down now, while the US presence offers some protection against India taking advantage of Pakistani civil strife (a proposition I consider unlikely, but some Indian hawks do suggest it from time to time).
I think we should take President Bush seriously. He says this campaign could take a year or two. An that's only the first phase. Gen. Musharraf is being optimistic, so that he doesn't have to make hard choices. I think he will probably have to maek them down the road.
Gaithersburg, Md.:
On Sept. 10, 2001 Pakistan was a Pariah state that sponsored and helped to build the Al Queda network, nourished, trained and provided active military support to it. Its military provided the Taleban reinforement during key battles with the Northern Alliance. Now, under pressure from the U.S. the unelected general has chosen to sell his soul and turn against the very men he helped to create in furtherance of his country's geopolitical ambitions. The momentary help is fine and saved Pakistan from being bombed itself but what sort of relationship should the U.S. maintain with Pakistan and its military dictators in the years to come?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: One would hope that Pakistan won't have military dictators in years to come, but that may be overly optimistic.
Pakistan's an important state - although it pales in size and resources to its Indian neighbor. At times, it has presented the possibility of becoming a legitimate "moderate" Islamic state - perhaps a contradiction in terms, but something the US would love to see as an example. It is positioned well for certain types of economic growth, particularly in the communications industry. It's also an inroad into Central Asia.
I think the US should attempt to find a relationship with Pakistan which is neither alliance nor abandonment, which would be a nice change. We will be constantly balancing Pakistani interests against Indian ones, since our relationship with India is growing so quickly - but that does not imply that because India is begger, we should abandon Pakistan. I think we need to continue to try to help resolve the Kashmir dispute, because if that is resolved the entire region changes fundamentally, and the tightrope the US has walked, mostly unsuccessfully, may suddenly become unnecessary.
tha'ts a vague answer, I know, but the best I can do in limited time.
Plainsville, USA:
Dr Timothy Hoyt: Are we as a people not all that too differant from the Speisser-mentality pre-war Germany in the thirties, who backed a charismatic figure... as the people now back another figure who tells us war is the only alternative and immediate agression the answer?
Restraint has been dashed on the rocks -- buried in the rubble of those terrorist attacks. As we bomb the heavens out of Afghanistan, with no assured plan for the outcome... and our enemies and our friends are hesitant participants (who is friend, enemy, we do not really know). All which gives us no security on the world stage, as we 'John Wayne' ourselves into a of future where there is no possibility of stability or a terror-free enviroment?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: We're not actually bombing the heavens out of Afghanistan - look at the data that's available on the internet and in the newspapers.
War, or a violent response, doesn't seem like an irrational act when faced with an opponent who kills thousands of your (innocent) citizens and is sworn to your destruction. It needs to be tempered by morality, practicality, and politics - something that the administration is, I believe, handling astutely.
The alternatives do not look good. We could pursue some kind of international tribunal, but without the threat of force, who would bring the criminals to justice, or dissuade future imitators?
I'm a great believer in trying to lead by example and turn the other cheek when possible. But to paraphrase St. Augustine, war is inevitable, although most wars can be avoided.
I would submit, humbly and gently, that this is one that should not and cannot be avoided. The demands of our adversaries are non-negotiable and unacceptable, and alternate means of resolving the issue satisfactorily do not, in my mind, exist.
none of this will bring perfect peace - but I believe a succesfull resolution can, used intelligently, bring us closer. And not resolving this conflict now will only leade to much greater death and destruction, and all those things that you wish most to avoid.
I do, however, think that the comparison with 1930s Germany is incredibly inappropriate.
Kennesaw, Ga.:
I think the major problem with us is, in the name of covert operations we are not building nations with democratic prinicples but with militaristic/terroristic countries which are haunting us now. Now instead of doing the same mistake twice we should not take support from Pakistan and we should try to change our foreign policy and support India which is a democratic country in their fight against terrorism in Kashmir. The reason why we should support India is they offered unconditional support when we were in need, whereas Pakistan's conditions for goodies show what kind of people we are dealing with.
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: The main problem is that India does not border Afghanistan, and Pakistan does. And Indian intelligence does not have the benefit of almost a decade of close cooperation with the Taliban, while ISI does.
Those are crucial reasons we need Paksitan's help - and the Pakistanis are trying to leverage that for all it's worth.
But our support for Pakistan under the circumstances neither threatens India nor constitutes a fundamental break from the trajectory of US-Indian relations, which is highly positive. It is simply a response to a vastly different circumstance - and (I would argue) a necessary one.
Park Point:
Dr Timothy Hoyt: What 'finer truths' are you tiptoeing around that may not be in step with our present administration's? Give us a clearer footprint?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Wow. I wish I knew more about finer truths.
My biggest concern with the administration is that they will prematurely escalate this conflict, particularly to Iraq. I'm no a supporter of Iraq, and particularly of Saddam Hussein - I think there's a strong argument that he represents the major threat to peace and stability in the broader MiddleEast/Persian Gulf region.
However, an attack on Saddam will fundamentally change the response of Muslims and Arab states to the US. It will be seen, in the absence of a smoking gun proving Iraqi involvement in Sept. 11, to be a cheap effort to take advantage of Muslim suport for a different war.
I think we need to be very careful about that.
I' have a meeting to go to, so I'll have to conclude that as the "finer truth" for today. Sorry about that - catch me the next time I'm on (if they actually bring me back < grin > ) and we can continue this discussion.
washingtonpost.com:
Subject:
LOL: 10/16 ENDNOTE
Date:
Tue, 16 Oct 2001 09:07:48 -0400
From:
Liz O'Leary
Organization:
WashingtonPost.Newsweek Interactive
To:
Korina Lopez , Live Online ,
Mary Remuzzi , William Pao ,
WPNI Editorial ,
Megan Rooney
That wraps up today's show. Thanks to everyone who joined the
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