Fiona Hill

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The terrorist attack on America instantly changed the relationship between Russia and the United States. President Vladimir Putin of Russia will visit the United States and hold a summit with President George Bush, and numerous issues will be under consideration: Central Asian nations and their role in the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan; America's response to Russia's war against domestic terrorists in Chechnya; Russia's response to American national missile defense plans; the role of Russia and the impact of the war on terrorism on U.S.-Russian relations; access to Central Asian oil and gas fields; and general questions on regional geopolitics.

Fiona Hill, Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program fellow and advisor on Strategic Planning to the Eurasia Foundation, will be online to take questions and comments on the summit, Putin and Russia's alliance with the United States in the wake of Sept. 11.

The discussion is the first of a regular series developed by The Brookings Institution Project on Terrorism and American Foreign Policy and washingtonpost.com to examine the key policy questions related to the U.S. fight against terrorism.

The transcript follows.

Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.

Cambridge, England: Dr. Hill,

In the run up to this potentially pivotal moment in U.S.-Russia relations, there are plenty of big issues on the table, such as Afghanistan and the ABM treaty. These issues have received much coverage and attention over the last few weeks.

Despite this recent coverage, I am still interested in Chechnya and how Russia is handling its military campaign there. I know you have worked on these issues at least since your time at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government in the '90s. With your long-term perspective, how do you think Chechnya will play in to this summit, if at all?

Fiona Hill: Thank you for the question. I don't think that Chechnya will be a major agenda item at the Summit, although it will be mentioned. President Bush will likely reinforce the Administration's established position that Russia needs to seek a negotiated solution to the war and to distinguish between the counter-terrorism campaign and the ongoing struggle over the political definition of Chechnya's relations with Moscow. This will probably take place behind the scenes.

The Bush Administration's public criticism of Russia's conduct of the war in Chechnya has been pretty muted since Missile Defense discussions with Moscow got underway, and this criticism will be even more muted as a result of the United States' own current campaign in Afghanistan, especially as civilian casualties increase there.

The events of September 11 have shifted the power balance somewhat for Russia in the war. The war is still unwinnable for Russia on the ground in Chechnya, but Moscow has had a victory of sorts in the war for public opinion. Chechen forces are linked with Al Qaeda, which has just committed the most appalling terrorist act in history, and the Chechen political grievances are now overshadowed by the association.

Even though US criticism may be muted and behind the scenes, the US and other international pressure on Moscow was in any case having little effect on Russia’s conduct of the war. Moscow knows it has to find some kind of negotiated political solution to the war over the long-term, and some semblance of negotiations with the Chechens and the government of Aslan Maskhadov are already underway. But these negotiations will certainly not lead to a decrease in military activities in Chechnya until Moscow is confident that it can find a solution on its own terms and will not have to submit itself to any potentially humiliating concessions (as Russian military and political leaders felt they did in 1996 at the end of the first war in Chechnya).

While negotiations drag out and the conflict continues, however, Russia will continue to incur considerable costs and Mr. Putin and other Russian politicians are very aware of what these are.

The costs of the war to Russia’s economy are significant. Although Russia is enjoying a considerable budget surplus because of high energy prices, the war remains a huge drain on the Russian budget, a major source of political destabilization, and is becoming increasingly unpopular among the Russian public.

Russian military commentators have estimated that extra pay for soldiers in the war alone costs the Russian government around $110 million per month. Adding in other costs, even conservative estimates for the annual total for the war in 2000 came to $2.2 billion. Other estimates put the financial costs of the war for the last two years at as high as $10 billion, which is a sum equivalent to almost 1/3 of official Russian federal budget expenditures in 2000. This kind of expenditure is not something that can be sustained for ever especially given Mr. Putin’s priorities for economic reform. And this does not even factor in the costs of large numbers of military and civilian casualties, the destruction of what was once one of the most liveable regions of the Russian Federation and a center of the oil industry, and the social costs from large numbers of traumatized former conscripts returning to Russia's regions. The day of reckoning for Russia will eventually come in Chechnya.

Arlington, Va.: What influence, if any, do you feel that domestic public opinion has had in the recent thaw in U.S.-Russian relations?

Historically, Russians have felt insecurity over their status as "Europeans" and this has played into the hands of isolationist and exceptionalist forces. Even if they are misreading Western perceptions, I get the impression from family and friends that, after Sept. 11, Russians see themselves in the same Muslim extremist-threatened boat as Americans, and are thus ready to accept accommodations on such issues as missile defense, NATO, etc.

Is this how you read the situation, or do you disagree?

Fiona Hill: Thank you for this question. I think it is indeed true that the Russians see themselves very much in the same boat as the US after September 11. President Putin had been raising the alarm about the threat of international terrorism for some considerable time and also urging the US and Europe to join Russia in an active campaign against terrorist threats. In part some of his urgency was linked to the desire to stave off criticism about Moscow's heavy-handling of its campaign in Chechnya and to depcit the war as a fight against terrorism rather than separatism, but at the same time, Russia did have good intelligence on the threat posed by the Al-Qaeda network and the terrorist training camps in Afghanistan.

Mr. Putin certainly saw this as common ground with the US and with Europe and has also been eager (as have other Russian leaders before him) to establish Russia as part of the common European political and economic space with Russia accepted as a full member.

This common ground on terrorism will not necessarily lead to concessions. Putins priorities are certainly focused on improving relations with the US and on bolstering Russia's economic development, but Putin does not want to concede anything to the US. He wants a relationship of equals and one which is on Russia's terms as well as the United States. This means a clear relationship with NATO and a US missile defense program that recognizes Russia's concerns and interests.

The fact that the US now needs Russia in the coalition against Al-Qaeda may make Putin just a little more confident that he can succeed on that basis.

Lynn, Mass.: Ms. Hill,
In your opinion, is Russia's recent level of cooperation and openness to dialogue with the U.S. due to a change in economic focus or is it due to the shared threat of attack by rogue nations, terrorist organizations and extremist groups? Or is it something else?
Thank you.

Fiona Hill: In many respects it is the US that is more open to dialogue now with Russia as a result of September 11 than the other way around. President Putin has actively sought to engage the US to change the focus of relations away from missile defense and related issues and pull the US into more multilateral relations from the beginning. He sees the US need and willingness to operate in a multilateral context in the fight against Al-Qaeda as an opportunity for establishing a new more cooperative phase in US-Russian relations that will defuse tensions and allow him to move ahead with his main priority--Russia's economic reform and development.

Washington, D.C.: What distinctions can be drawn between Islamic fundamentalist rebels in Chechnya and groups such as the Basqu sepratists, ETA, in terms of classification as terrorist groups?

Fiona Hill: The conflict in Chechnya has evolved considerably over time since its first outbreak in the early 1990s when it began as a dispute over Chechnya's political status within Russia.

Since Chechnya's independence and especially as a result of Moscow's two military campaigns there, Chechen forces have become radicalized and have been infiltrated by outside groups. Like Bosnia and Kosovo, Chechnya became the destination for large numbers of young, disaffected Muslim men from Europe and the Middle East who wanted to define and find themselves in a "jihad." Many of these came directly to Chechnya in the first war, and as the conflict progressed many of them were then trained first in Afghanistan's training camps. The "Arabs" or "Afghans," as these fighters have been called, are not popular in Chechnya even though the Chechen forces have come to rely on their military support. They clearly have very different aims from the Chechen population and do not share their vision of an independent peaceful and prosperous Chechnya, and they have beeen accused of attrocities themselves against the civilian population.

In terms of distinctions, ETA is a homegrown group among Basque separatists. Many of the Islamic fundamentalist rebels you refer to in Chechnya are an alien terrorist and fighting force that has radicalized some of the indigenous Chechne forces and now greatly complicates the prospects for accommodation between Russia and Chechnya.

Harrisburg, Pa.: What is your assessment of how well democratic reforms have been successful in Russia? To what degree does Russia's poor economy threaten these reforms? How stable is the democratic progress that has been made, and what is your evaluation of how further reforms may be implemented and sustained?

Fiona Hill: Many members of the Russian political and economic elite see Russia's economic success and progress in democratization as linked, and would argue that as the economy improves and Russian citizens' material interests are addressed, political stability will increase and democratization will proceed. That might also be Putin's argument.

Clearly there has been considerable progress in expanding the political space in Russia since the collapse of the USSR. President Yeltsin, for all his faults, was instrumental in capitalizing on the reforms already undertaken by Gorbachev to entrench the concept of democratic elections, a degree of powersharing and checks and balances, ensuring freedom of speech and assembly etc.

To some degree some of these gains have been curbed since Putin's accession to power, he has reined in the press as an instrument to criticize the government and the President, squeezed human rights organizations and other NGOs--or at least made it more difficult for them to operate, and clearly allowed considerable abuses of human rights to continue in Chechnya (although President Yeltsin was also very much guilty of this and was the instigator of the war). But Putin has forged ahead with an extremely liberal agenda of economic reform, which so far seems to be having some success as well as garnering praise internationally.

President Putin's overall goal is to strengthen the Russian state, and he has singled out strengthening the economy as the means to that end. Unfortunately in Russia, strengthening the state has traditionally taken place at the expense of society, and this is where future reforms will have to concentrate, on strengthening society in tandem with the state.

Here the US and Russia's other international partners can play a role in targeting assistance toward civil society initiatives at the grassroots level. And US-supported institutions like the Eurasia Foundation, based here in Washington DC, are doing just that--targeting small grants to indigenous Russian NGOs and local Russian governments to assist them to expand the political space for their operations and to step in and fill some of the gaps left by the central state in addressing society's needs. This grassroots approach has proven effective, and I would encourage you to check out the Eurasia Foundation's website at www.eurasia.org.

Rockville, Md.: Given the long-term nature of the U.S. initiatives, how important is Russia's support in the war on terrorism? What strategic concession(s) has the U.S. made to Putin in exchange for their support? Has the expected support been forthcoming?

Fiona Hill: Russia's support for the "war on terrorism" is extremely important at this stage, where the first phase is concentrated on removing Afghanistan as a base for terrorist operations. Clearly, Russia has long-term historic linkages with Afghanistan and the broader Central Asia region, and its own bitter experience of conflict in Afghanistan, as well as important relations with some of the other regional states, including the Central Asian states, Iran, China and India (Russia's relations with Pakistan are strained).

Russia's decision not to obstruct US efforts to conduct part of the campaign in Afghanistan from Central Asian territory is significant--especially in the case of Tajikistan, where Moscow is esentially responsible for maintaining security and most importantly for patrolling the border with Afghanistan. Russia clearly hopes that by cooperating with the US early and actively it will have an opportunity to help shape the future military, political and economic outcomes in Central Asia and Afghanistan which is important to Russia's own interests. And Russia's support has been forthcoming in Central Asia, in terms of assistance with bases and intelligence etc..

We are more likely to face problems if the campaign moves out of Afghanistan and into the Middle East where US and Russian interests will diverge, especially on critical countries like Iraq.

Southbury, Conn.: Is there any merit to the notion that the U.S. is trying to improve its relations with Russia because,

1. China is becoming a super power and the west sees it as a potential threat
2. Lot of undesirable incidents took place in the recent past, pushing US-China relationships to an edge
3. Taiwan issue will someday likely become a threat to U.S. interests in the East

Fiona Hill: I don't think at this juncture that the decision to improve relations with Russia has much to do with US calculations on China. Although Russia has recently signed a friendship treaty with China, Russia's own influence in East Asia has declined considerably since the collapse of the USSR, and Russia and China themselves have a lot of divergent interests--including in Central Asia. For the US, Russia is much more a factor in European security issues and now very clearly in Central Asia, where, for now, China is more of a secondary player.

Alexandria, Va.: No rational person who is familiar with Iranian support for terrorism (such as the 1994 bombing of the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires) can possibly feel safe if Iran has nuclear weapons.

What can be done to dissuade Putin from selling nuclear technology to Iran?

Fiona Hill: Many military and political observers in Russia are quite nervous themselves about selling nuclear technology to Iran that could be used for purposes other than the development of Iran's domestic nuclear energy/power program. And there have been efforts inside Russia and by Putin to limit the kinds of technology sold.

But Russia also has quite a different view of Iran to the US. It tends to see Iran as a status quo power and more of a nationally-focused state player than as a radical Islamic or revolutionary regime that would be prepared (at this juncture) to act as a "rogue" state.

US arms sales in general (beyond nuclear technology) are also a major factor in generating hard currency revenues, second only to energy and other raw material sales. In fact weapons are almost the only Russian manufactured goods that are competitive on world markets, and Russia is very much a niche exporter of arms and weapons technology to those states that will or can not buy US weapons (which dominate the market). So Russia will continue to sell weapons to Iran (along with China, Syria and other states of concern) even if it does curb itself some of the most worrisome technology.

Arms sales need to be a point of discussion in US-Russian relations in the context of Russia's overall economic priorities.

San Antonio, Tex.: Is there a possibility for Russian ground troops in Afghanistan, beyond supplying military supplies and logistics?

Could we see Russia take a role in a post-Taliban recovery, simliar to Russia's unexpected cooperation with NATO in Kosovo?

Fiona Hill: The Russians will obviously be very nervous about committing any ground troops to the campaign in Afghanistan given their past history and the ongoing conflict in Chechnya. This would be an unpopular move with the Russian public who are already concerned about the direction of the US campaign in Afghanistan. However, we might behind the scenes see some involvement of small numbers of highly-specialized Russian troops in limited and very specific operations with US forces, but this would likely be kept very quiet. Russia will, however, continue its active material support to the Northern Alliance which may also include the use of Russian military trainers.

As far as post-Taliban recovery is concerned, Russia is highly likely to want to play a significant role here in brokering a political solution and in seeing the creation of a new Afghan government, especially given its stake in the Northern Alliance.

Russia also does not have the wherewithal to play an active role in economic reconstruction in Afghanistan and will likely concentrate on the political side.

This, however, will be very difficult for the US to reconcile with Pakistan, given the fact that Russia and Pakistan have been on opposite sides of the civil war in Afghanistan since the 1990s.

San Antonio, Tex.: You mentioned that Putin wants Russia to be treated as an equal partner in the global realm of diplomatic affairs. But how can this be acknowledged when Russia's economy is the size of Illonois?

Can it be said that much of Russia's diplomatic leverage is derived from its past glory and future potential, and not on any actual "power" it may have today?

Fiona Hill: The answer to this question depends on what and where we're talking about. Clearly, Russia has lost its global reach, is a declining power in Europe, and Asia (in comparison with China and even India) and is not a major factor in the world economy (hence Putin's emphasis on economic reform and growth). But, Russia is still a political and military factor in regional terms in Europe and Asia--and is an especially important factor for US purposes now in Central Asia. Russia remains the only state with the nuclear capacity to destroy the United States, and although it may have lost power in conventional terms it has still retained the ability to influence developments both negatively and positively in areas immediately on its borders. Absent the current crisis, I doubt that the US would be paying so much attention to Russia, but the fact that the crisis has happened outside Europe in Central Asia has reminded the US that Russia does still matter--in some places and in some contexts.

Washington, D.C.: While the issue of NATO expansion has been out there for the past 7 to 8 years, I do not think that it has been clearly thought through. Specifically, I don't think that there has been a great deal of thought (at least at the highest levels) about the endgame of this process vis-a-vis Russia. Are we ultimately going to accept virtually all the countries around Russia leaving them isolated? Are we going to leave some of those countries out simply so we don't leave Russia out? Or are we going to ultimately bring Russia into NATO - which by definition fundamentally changes the nature of the organization - which after all, was set up to defend against Russia. So how do you see this playing out - particularly given Putin's present choice to throw his lot clearly with the West? Would a future NATO, with Russia as a member and a new mandate (whatever that is) be both viable and a potentially effective force? And what the heck would they do -- especially assuming that there won't be anymore Yugoslavia's in Europe itself?

Fiona Hill: This is an interesting question and you have posed the issues well. Ironically, the current crisis in Afghanistan and the US "war against terrorism" may in fact help to resolve some of the outstanding questions for Russia in Europe.

In spite of the invocation of Article 5 this is NOT a NATO operation. It’s a US unilateral operation with some support from allies, most notable Great Britain (potentially with Australia, Italy and some others), and it follows from a pattern of US joint activities with Central Asian states since the late 1990s that have not been clearly within a NATO/Partnership for Peace framework.

Now, in Afghanistan and Central Asia, Russia and the US are cooperating outside the NATO framework for the first time (unlike the Balkans). And the war in Afghanistan also marks a shift in US strategic priorities away from Europe. As a result, this may mark the reduction of NATOs importance as a security structure for the US.

We may indeed see Russia’s wish granted to have NATO redefined as a European security structure with a definite role for Russia thanks to the unfolding campaign in Afghanistan--and the fact that Europe is no longer the focal point of security discussions that it was in the 1990s.

washingtonpost.com:

That wraps up today's show. Thanks to everyone who joined the discussion.

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