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America At War:
Military Options
With Dr. Timothy Hoyt
Research Fellow,
Center for Peace and Security Studies,
Georgetown University
Tuesday, Nov. 13, 2001; Noon EST
U.S. planes continue to drop bombs on Taliban frontline positions north of Kabul and in positions outside the southern city of Kandahar. But two obstacles could make any military actions in the coming months difficult -- the onset of the brutal Afghani winter and the beginning of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
Dr. Timothy Hoyt, research fellow at the Center for Peace and Security Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Services at Georgetown University, will be online Tuesday, Nov. 13 at Noon EST, to discuss U.S. military strategy, targets and coalition involvement.
Hoyt has designed and coordinated political-military simulations for universities, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. He has worked for the U.S. Army, the U.S. Department of State, and as a researcher on defense issues for the Library of Congress. He has written on a variety of subjects, including the diffusion of military technologies and practices, the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons, regional security in the Middle East and South Asia, and the evolution of strategy and arms production in the developing world.
A transcript follows.
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Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Hello again. The recent successes of the Northern Alliance appear to have fundamentally changed the situation in Afghanistan, so I'm sure we have a lot to talk about. As before, I've tried to pre-answer some of the older questions, and will type as fast as I can to keep up with new ones. I'll use "NA" as an abbreviation for Northern Alliance, because it's easier to type.
Thanks for all your questions and your patience.
Alexandria, Va.:
Is there any danger of "blowback" from the U.S. support for the Northern Alliance?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Alexandria, VA:
There is some danger of blowback, but not necessarily in the prospect of NA forces attacking the US. There is a danger that the NA factions will fall into another pointless round of ethnic conflict and/or cleansing. There is a potential for reprisals, executions, and other kinds of human rights violations. But the US has also shown that it can't really control the NA, and the NA has shown that it can't really control its troops, so there's a strong possibility for chaos, at a minimum.
Alexandria, Va.:
In 1991 President George H.W. Bush refused to help Shiite and Kurdish rebels in Iraq because the U.S. wanted Iraqi Sunnis to overthrow Saddam.
Now the U.S. is saying that it doesn't want the Northern Alliance to capture Kabul because it wants "all tribes" (i.e. Pashtos) to help govern Afghanistan.
Are we making the same mistake again?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Alexandria, VA:
The situations are a little different - in this case, NA is in the process of actually physically liberating a large part of Afghanistan, with active US air support. In Iraq, we made statements and actions that encouraged the Kurds and Shiites to rebel, but then refused to provide them with support. But there are some similarities - we're not giving people who are fighting our enemies our wholehearted support.
However, and this is a similarity, there are also alliance pressures. Pakistan has been very outspoken about its concerns over the future Afghan government, largely because they had such a close relationship with Taliban and such a poor relationship with NA. In addition, the UN desperately needs to get involved here - unlike Iraq, Afghanistan hasn't had a tradition of strong central government for a while, and peacekeeping forces and refugee and humanitarian assistance are desperately needed. Hopefully, the NA's recent victories will allow a massive humanitarian effort in the north, which is badly needed.
Fairfax, Va.:
We know how the governments and the people of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan think of bin Laden and like. UAE was identified as the third entity that was supporting the Taliban. Where do they stand now? Are they being helpful with the allied efforts to get at the Taliban in all the ways (financial, military, etc.)
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Fairfax, VA:
The Saudis remain reluctant partners, but are quite irate with the criticism which has been appearing in US newspapers and other media. The UAE has been cooperating quietly. Pakistan is on the front lines, but their support remains uncertain. President Musharraf has committed himself to supporting the US. Other political figures in Pakistan are far more critical. Pakistani intelligence has strong connections with Taliban, and it is not clear whether we are receiving their wholehearted cooperation. In addition, Musharraf has been quite vocal in his efforts to maintain some "moderate Taliban" or Pashtun presence in a future Afghan government - a clear attempt to assert Pakistan's more narrow national interest onto coalition goals. According to a recent Western report, Pakistan's relationship with Taliban was close enough that in the midst of their 1999 war with India over the Kargil region, they asked Taliban if they could store Pakistani nuclear weapons on Afghan soil to protect them from possible Indian attack.
I think you could make an argument that we've received some support from all three states, but that they could all give us more.
Burke, Va.:
1. Why would the cold not HELP in using infrared sensors to find cave openings; why would snow not HELP track on-ground movement by Taliban/AQ forces; why would the winter not HELP those with the most technology to move about in the air and on the snow?
2. Have two warring Islamic nations EVER stopped for this holiday? I thought that history showed that they always or almost always just fought on through it. Will Al Qaeda take this time off? Willing to bet your life and mine on that?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Burke, VA:
1. It would help some, but weather also restricts our ability to use this technology, since planes have difficulty flying, and cloud cover and snow block other sensors at least some of the time. Fighting in the Hindu Kush in the winter is very difficult. However, now that the fighting appears to be moving south, military operations will be easier and more effective.
2. Al Qaeda won't stop for Ramadan. The Egyptians and Syrians attacked Israel in Ramadan. The taboo against war during Ramadan is a bit murky at best. The arguments for stopping the bombing during Ramadan are primarily political, and aimed at reassuring Arab populations about the US war effort. At this point, given NA's recent success, I'd be very surprised if we stopped the air campaign - it appears that the Taliban are on the run, and it would probably be a good idea to push them as hard as possible in the hope that they will fold.
Auburn, Ala.:
Dr. Hoyt,
As one who has planned several embassy bombings among others, one would assume that bin Laden to be very intelligent as far as stratigical decisions are concerned. It naturally follows that after the WTO bombings he might have expected what is happening now. My question is do you think bin Laden made a miscalculation somewhere or he was actually prepared for all this and is ready with the reply just waiting for the right oppurtunity. Seeing all this are you sure that we are "winning."
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Auburn, AL:
I am sure that Al Qaeda has the capability to carry out more strikes, and the series of warnings we have received from the FBI and Dept. of Justice suggest that the threat is still quite serious. There will be more terrorist incidents - perhaps not as serious as Sept. 11th, but that can't be guaranteed. The concern over the airline crash yesterday in New York suggests how seriously we take this possibility.
That said, I think it's fair to say that for the moment, this conflict is going rather well - particularly when compared to last week. Taliban is currently on the run, although it's not clear whether it is broken or not (it may continue resisting in the Pashtun south). But Al Qaeda no longer has a "legitimate" government providing it with territorial and political support, and the Al Qaeda volunteer brigade fighting for Taliban has been a target of significant bombing. The war is far from over - but it's going fairly well. But the likelihood of continued terrorist attacks against the US and its allies remains quite high, despite our recent efforts at homeland defense and alliance coordination.
Tallahassee, Fla.:
The Taliban is retreating rapidly, and in my view American air power will make it hard for them to launch counteroffensives. Do you believe the Taliban are prepared to try to maintain a defensive line in southern areas of Afghanistan more sympathetic to them, or will they prefer -- or be forced -- to move to a more fragmented, guerrila-based form of resistance.
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Tallahassee, FL:
It's not clear. Afghan wars in the past have been resolved rather abruptly - the Northern Alliance seized control of Afghanistan from the former Soviet backed regime in a very short time, when the government forces collapsed. Taliban seized power when the Northern Alliance forces abruptly collapsed. Now Taliban appears to have collapsed.
These are not regular, professional military forces on either side, and they are not backed by solid logistics and supply. It's not clear how much authority higher commanders have, especially in the Northern Alliance, where various factions have been competing with one another for authority. The NA forces may need time to resupply and consolidate control over the north. They may not WANT to go south - it's hard to tell at this point. They were, by all accounts, outnumbered by Taliban, and it's not clear how much that has changed, although there are reports of defections (near Mazar-I-Sharif and Kabul) and of local uprisings (near Herat) playing crucial roles in NA successes.
One thing NA does have is US bombing strikes. These have profound morale effects against untrained troops (one reason among many we're using lots of B-52s, which drop huge numbers of bombs on the front lines). In addition, supported by Special Forces, they're capable of very sophisticated precision strikes when we identify specific targets. I think this has been a big assistance to the NA - neither side really relies a lot on heavier weapons (large numbers of tanks or artillery), and having the US Navy and Air Force providing air support has helped NA enormously.
If Taliban doesn't collapse and NA doesn't want to move south, then we will have to decide whether we want to do it with our own ground forces. That will be a serious debate in the administration.
Oslo, Norway:
How do you get a humane government in Afganistan, that values individual rights?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Oslo, Norway:
I don't think we can set one up. Only the Afghan people can create and sustain that kind of government. However, the political regime under the old King was much more tolerant and humane than any of the regimes since his overthrow. Afghanistan does have a historical model of humane government that respects individual (and gender) rights. The question is whether it can reestablish that kind of regime.
One thing the US and the rest of the world can do to help is to provide economic support to rebuild the country (which is devastated), help with clearing landmines, and political support for moderate elements. The UN will probably have to pitch in with peacekeeping forces - something it doesn't want to do, because it is afraid of failure. But if the UN can't help with this obvious crisis of governance and humanitarian need, what exactly is its role in the emerging world?
Industry, Calif.:
If we are delcaring war on Afghanastan, then why don't we pull out all the weaponry and manpower availble and win the war as fast as possible?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Industry, CA:
It depends on how you answer two questions: who are we fighting, and what are we fighting for? The administration has defined our enemy as "global terrorism", and our enemy in Afghanistan is Taliban - a regime which supports Al Qaeda and other extremist Islamic terrorists. We are trying to limit the damage to the rest of Afghanistan, since the Afghan people are the victims of Taliban, rather than whole-hearted supporters. We hope to create a friendly Afghan regime at the end of the war, to help ensure that terrorism does not remain in the country or ever gain a foothold again.
What are we fighting for? The administration has not said this publicly - but one of the things we are fighting for is to avoid a "clash of civilizations" between Islam and the West. This is what Bin Laden wants, and what he says already exists. We're trying to avoid that, and one way to help with that goal is to avoid killing innocent Muslim civilians through a more aggressive war in Afghanistan.
Carl von Clausewitz wrote that war is permeated by political issues. We are deliberately utilizing our military capability in ways that, hopefully, will have positive political impact and will allow us to more quickly and successfully accomplish our political goals - crushing global terrorism and moving towards a better relationship between Islam and the rest of the world. The latter is a much more difficult task, that will (at best) take a generation or more and probably can't be managed through military force. However, the indiscriminate use of military force (however tactically successful) would make accomplishing a better relationship much more difficult.
Talkeetna, Alaska:
Dear Dr. Hoyt;
Looking at a map of Afghanistan, it seems to be at the nexus of the spheres of influence of Russia, China, 'Arabia' and the Indian-sub-continent. If the Taliban conduct a war of attrition or if the a continued U.S. military presence is required in Central Asia to insure the stability of the region, does the U.S. have a clear exit strategy? That is, which surrounding nation would benefit the most from the U.S. finding itself in a 'quagmire' in Afghanistan? And do any of those surrounding nations have the covert means to seek that objective (for their national and regional interests)?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Talkeetna, Alaska:
I'm not sure the US has a clear exit strategy, or that it's entirely clear how willing the US is to use major ground forces in the region. This answer is admittedly very different than it might have been a week ago, before the NA began conspicuously winning. But there is a strong temptation to use our allies as much as possible, to limit both US casualties and the political consequences of the US getting involved in the ground war in a major way - this might unite opposition against us, for instance.
The best choice for a long-term arbiter in this region is the UN. Given the vicious political debate over US peacekeeping forces in areas which are much closer to us (Haiti, Kosovo, Bosnia), I expect there would be strong resistance to an extended US commitment in Afghanistan, and neither Iran, Russia, nor Pakistan would necessarily be happy about our long-term presence in the region. Clearly, Russia should not play that role, given their Cold War history in the region, and the US would have objections to Iran increasing their role in Central Asia. Pakistan would love to be the power selected to assure stability in the region, but it's not clear that would be a good idea either - they backed the Taliban, and have used Afghanistan as a training ground for the Islamic forces which they infiltrate into Kashmir, so it is not clear that a Pakistani-backed regime would be opposed to terrorism.
Athens, Ohio:
How likely is it that the people of Kabul and Kandahar will support the Northern Alliance (and turn against the Taliban) as the alliance continues its conquests towards the south?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Athens, OH:
We've been taken over by events, at least a little. Kabul apparently supports NA. I'm not sure about Kandahar. Militarily, it would be a good idea to pursue the Taliban as hard as possible, to prevent them from recovering and to minimize public support in the south (since it looks like the Taliban is losing).
Karachi, Pakistan:
What is the new strategy of America for the Northern Alliance? When are they going to capture the capital city Kabul? Remember that the U.S. have asked them to avoid that city.
What do you think in such situations when the anti-Taliban forces don't obey the U.S. wishes?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Karachi, Pakistan:
Again, we're overtaken by events. The NA couldn't stop their troops, according to press reports, from entering the city. The NA aren't the best solution for Afghanistan, in the long run, unless they change their ways and stop fighting amongst themselves. We've had a lot of trouble coordinating with the NA, and I wouldn't expect that to change - their wishes and US desires may differ significantly.
Zurich, Switzerland:
Sir,
It is a well known fact that Pakistan overtly and covertly supports the Taliban Militia in Afghanistan. It is also believed that the Taliban is the creation of Pakistan and recent reports indicate that many Taliban fighters were from Pakistan.
Isn't the U.S. being deceived by Pakistan by on one hand, being a frontline ally in resisting terrorism and on the other hand syphoning the billions received through aid from the west back to the Taliban? Or is the U.S. pursuing a different ball game altogether?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Zurich, Switzerland:
As I mentioned in an earlier post, I do not think we are receiving total cooperation from Pakistan. They have aided Taliban in the past, continue to support some form of Taliban presence in a coalition government, strongly express preferences regarding US military operations, and want a role in Afghanistan when the war is over.
I don't think the US is playing a different game. I think we needed Pakistani help to fight Taliban - nobody knows them better, and even if we don't get full cooperation the intelligence and support we get from Pakistan is probably more important than from any other single source. That's worth a significant bribe (economic aid) and also is worth ignoring the lack of cooperation in some areas. However, this is a short-term cooperation based on immediate need. In the longer-term, the US relationship with Pakistan will be balanced against the relationship with India and with other regional states. It will also be balanced against continued Pakistani support for militants in Kashmir, against possible future Pakistani attacks on India like the Kargil invasion of 1999, and against other Pakistani behavior which might destabilize the region or support terrorism in various forms. That will be a much higher standard that Pakistan will have to meet in order to maintain relations at their current friendly and economically profitable level.
I don't think there's any evidence of Pakistan siphoning US funds to Taliban since the war began. That would be an incredibly dumb thing to do, since the ramifications of getting caught have been made quite clear to Pakistan's leadership in a series of "you're either for us or against us" declarations. I think Pakistani support for Taliban continues in various forms, but more in terms of withholding intelligence and information from the US.
Chicago, Ill.:
Greetings,
Most of my reading and research over the past decade has been about Tajikistan, not the Afghanistan situations. It isn't possible to separate the two completely.
Am I reading into the Afghan experience the Tajik perspective that the borders imposed really have no meaning to the people living in the environments? Are the Pushtuns Balkanized to the point that a separate state would be positive at this point?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Chicago, IL:
The problem with the Pushtuns is the permeability of the border with Pakistan, and the fact that there have been strong Pushtun nationalist sentiments in Pakistan in the past. This is one of the reasons the Pakistanis are quite concerned about keeping Afghanistan intact under a coalition government - the Balkanization of Afghanistan could raise problems for Pakistani stability. Afghanistan has never formally recognized the validity of the Durand Line between the two states, and has attempted to support Pushtun separatism in the past. If Afghanistan splinters, life in the region gets much more complicated than it already is.
Sparta, N.J.:
When is the U.S. going to get strike aircraft in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan or Afghanistan?
It looks like we missed a good chance to attack fleeing Taliban troops. The aircraft from the carriers are too far away. It would be better to have F-15's or A-10's attack them from closer in.
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Sparta, NJ:
We need to get permission from our allies to use bases for military strikes. So far, they've been reluctant to cooperate in that for reasons of their own political stability. That may be changing now.
Liverpool, N.Y.:
In the rush of the Northern Alliance into Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul and Herat, we seem to have forgotten about al Qaeda and bin Laden. While I'm sure the U.S. and Britain are continuing to try to hunt them down, what specific successes against al Qaeda have we really had thus far? And, what can we really do to roust them, oust them or -- to be blunt -- annihilate them?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: According to press reports, we've very specifically targeted the "volunteer brigade" Bin Laden funds to support the Taliban. This is pretty significant - if these non-Afghans could get smuggled out of the country, they would provide the basis for new cells for Al Qaeda at some future date. Instead, we've caught them relatively in the open, and are reportedly pummeling them with conventional bombs. That's probably a significant blow to their long term capability.
There has also been a lot of cooperation between intelligence and police organizations, only some of which is coming into the public eye. The police in Germany, for instance, have been working hard to uncover Al Qaeda cells in Hamburg and elsewhere. The US detains large numbers of people under investigation - amidst some complaints of serious legal abuses. Abu Sayyaf, a group in the Philippines, has been identified as an Al Qaeda associate, and the US is providing various forms of support to the Phillipine government to eliminate that organization as a threat. there have also been reports that the US is preparing for cooperation against Al Qaeda cells in Somalia, Sudan, and other states.
These aren't quick, decisive, war-winning successes - but this is also not the Gulf War. This will take a long time, and not all the victories will be public due to political sensitivity or concern for revealing intelligence sources and methods. But removing the regime which provides Al Qaeda with territorial sanctuary (Taliban) is also a truly crucial step in eliminating Al Qaeda and setting an example for other governments that might support Al Qaeda or organizations like it.
Boston, Mass.:
Dr. Hoyt,
Observations:
- Bush tells Northern Alliance not to take
Kabul; they take Kabul.
- Northern Alliance seem to be the ones
in control of things over there, and seem
to have their own agenda for the war.
- They are beginning to act like thugs in
some of the cities they have taken over.
Questions:
-Are we being used? It appears that they
are happy to have our assistance to
accomplish their own goals.
- If they can wipe out the Taliban for us,
what are we doing there?
- How much safer is the world now that
military objectives are being exceeded?
- When will we know that we have
stopped all terrorism?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: 1. Yes, we're being used. That's one of the things that happens in formal and informal military alliances. And we're using them, too. We don't control the Northern Alliance - hopefully we can exert enough influence to keep them from going on an "ethnic cleansing" binge, however.
2. They're succeeding, I would argue, largely because of US help. The air power that we're bringing to bear on Taliban, in addition to economic and political pressures, is crucial for the underequipped and poorly trained NA forces. They're hard fighters, but this is a totally different form of war, and we're pulverizing their opponents - who are also tough fighters as individuals, but poorly trained, poorly equipped, and in many cases poorly motivated. Our bombing creates military opportunities and also encourages Taliban defection - crucial elements in the NA's sudden success.
3. I don't know if military objectives are being exceeded - we intended to remove the Taliban from power. this is happening in a way that we might not have predicted, but it is in accord with our broader intentions. I'm not sure NA taking power in Afghanistan makes that country or the region stable - but I think it makes the world LESS dangerous, because they will not provide support for Al Qaeda.
4. The $64,000 question. We won't. We will see a significant, long term decrease in terrorist incidents, if we're lucky. We can get some idea of whether we're being effective ("winning") by things like Al Qaeda cells destroyed, foreign support for anti-terrorist efforts, bank accounts frozen and funding denied, and other measures.
Honestly, the day when terrorism ceases is probably the day when political conflict ceases. I don't think this will be the "war to end all wars" - but if we handl;e it properly, it could be a war which leads to a substantially safer and more stable world.
Arlington, Va.:
Do you think treating the Sept. 11 attack as a criminal act and going after the suspects in a police action, with commandos used to seize suspects and bring them to U.S. courts, could have been effective? Also, if this had been done, and the U.S. had communicated to the world an intention to become more involved (and more cooperative) in setting up a permanent International Criminal Court to address future problems, would the long term situation look a little more positive?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: It might have been effective, but we lacked the intelligence and international support to get that done quickly and efficiently - if, indeed, at all. Bin Laden is, at best, a mass murderer or a war criminal, and perhaps some sort of trial will ultimately be the best way to deal with him. However, so long as Afghanistan, led by Taliban, provided him with safety and shelter and refused to cooperate, it could have been very difficult to get him to trial.
I don't think the administration went to war without thinking about this option. I just think they dismissed it as unworkable and inappropriate, given the number of American dead. Efforts like this have been used before - after the Lockerbie murders, for instance - but they take a long time and haven't always had satisfactory results.
San Diego, Calif.:
With the "fall" of Kabul and the rest of the weekend Northern Alliance successes, should the U.S. and its allies reconsider a ceasefire during Ramadan?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: I think the two best reasons to consider a ceasefire are: 1) concern for Muslim public opinion, particularly regarding long wars with massive civilian casualties, and 2) trying to emphasize humanitarian relief efforts.
Under the circumstances, the fall of the north has immeasurably increased the chances of serious humanitarian relief due to the capture of airfields and the establishment of land-lines of supply to neighboring states. So I'm not sure that really requires or supports a Ramadan ceasefire - we can now do both much more easily, and have the option of providing significant assistance to the Afghani people.
The first issue is more serious, but it is also an argument for NOT stopping the bombing. The best way to end this conflict quickly, thus minimizing civilian casualties and suffering, is to completely rout and defeat the Taliban. The best way to do that is to continue air attacks and urge the NA forces to pursue into the south, possibly reinforced (although this is very politically controversial) by US ground forces, to destroy the Taliban forces before they can catch their breath, resupply, and reorganize.
I would be much more supportive of a Ramadan ceasefire for political reasons if the stalemate had continued - we could have called off the bombing and put the resources into humanitarian relief, which would have (hopefully) had a positive political effect on the Islamic world. In the current situation, thinking as a military analyst, I'd press the advantage and keep after Taliban, hoping to destroy them quickly.
Boston, Mass.:
Do you see the Taliban pursuing a strategy of surrendering the cities and fighting a guerrilla campaign in the countryside, similar to how the Mujahadin resisted the Soviets? How can the Northern Alliance secure the wide areas they now control with just a small core of troops of relatively questionable loyalty?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: That's a very good question. I'm not sure if Taliban will try to hold the south or will disperse. The NA can't really hold the country without popular support, but the Afghan people clearly are pretty unhappy with the Taliban, and may prefer the NA.
If the Taliban disperse, they may become vulnerable. They are, largely, foreigners, in a land that is fiercely nationalistic. Many Afghans refer to the Taliban as "Arabs", and haven't enjoyed being ruled by foreigners. This is something we should point out repeatedly in news and propaganda broadcasts - US military forces are only helping the AFghans to liberate themselves from foreign control (again).
I think the NA can control the northern part of the country, and perhaps the South as part of a coalition - but only if they can keep from fighting themselves. That's not guaranteed, based on past behaviour.
Philadelphia, Pa.:
What would you say are the implications of today's developments (the fall of Kabul, etc.) for the terrorist threat to the US, especially major stuff (nuclear, chemical, etc.) that I assume Al-Qaeda needs substantial and stable facilities for?
Thank you.
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Denying Al Qaeda territorial sanctuary helps. It's tougher for them to train, and tougher for them to set up large infrastructure and buildings (which are useful for producing chemical weapons, etc.).
However, many Al Qaeda facilities remain in the south, near Kandahar. Also, Al Qaeda has financial resources which allow them to buy - or at least try to buy - weapons of mass destruction from states or transnational criminal groups with state connections. I'm not sure Al qaeda is in the military industry business - it may prefer to let other states do the work and then purchase the products on an occasional basis. This is a powerful argument for those who want to take the war to Iraq - it is a very likely source of chemical or biological weapons to terrorist organizations, since it possesses the industrial infrastructure and also has supported terrorists and anti-American attacks in the past.
this is a serious policy dilemma, and still hasn't been resolved in the administration.
Falls Church, Va.:
What would you consider an end-game situation for the current campaign in Afghanistan? That is, at what point will interested parties declare that all objectives -- military objectives anyway -- have been acheived? Would a situation involving a lingering Taliban presence, much as the Northern Alliance hung on in the north for so many years, still allow for stability under a new government?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: I would consider the appropriate end-game for Afghanistan to be the complete defeat of the Taliban and their replacement by a government which will support the US in its efforts to root Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan. That new government might have "moderate Taliban" elements in it, although I suspect that "moderate Taliban" remains something of a contradiction in terms.
But I don't think you can be sure that Al Qaeda is gone from Afghanistan until Taliban is out of power and a new regime has been established which will allow the US to operate (alone or jointly) to make sure Al Qaeda is eliminated in-country.
Philadelphia, Pa.:
I have a somewhat morbid question. Has the United States been taking out retreating Taliban troops so that they can't go south to Kandahar and hunker down in caves for the long haul? It seems that they would be ripe targets if they were retreating and U.S. planes could get rid of them sooner rather than later.
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: I'm not sure it's happening yet, but there's a strong military argument for it.
On the other hand, that can have political costs. Remember all the controversy over the "Road of Death" in Iraq?
But I think at a minimum, the US should be targeting the Al Qaeda units - we're at war, and we shouldn't let them get away.
Manassas, Va.:
I have several:
1. Has the intelligence capability improved enough to be "successful" in the long term?
2. What can be used to "motivate" or encourage the Pashtuns in the south to join the fight?
3. A stable long-term government with a viable economy is critical to encourage Afganis to return and to discourage terrorists from making a "home" there. What kind of government do you envision?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: I don't think our intelligence capability in South or Central Asia - or in parts of the Middle East and Persian Gulf, for that matter - is adequate. It takes years to train agents, years to infiltrate them into positions where they have access to important information, and years for them to recruit local agents who can provide the kinds of information we'd really like to have. Rebuilding US human intelligence capabilities in this part of the world will take a long time - and although we have impressive electronic and other technological means, they have real limitations as well. So I think our intelligence capabilities still need more work.
I'd offer the Pashtuns a very serious bribe, although that's not a very diplomatic term. I'd put a bounty on Bin Laden's head, as well as most of his Al Qaeda leadership. I'd also offer Pashtun leaders some assured portion of a decentralized Afghan coalition government, with substantial local autonomy, guaranteed foriegn aid for rebuilding the country, and some kindof UN oversight to make sure things didn't get out of hand. All I'd want in return was support in finding and eliminating Al Qaeda, and in ending Afghan support for terrorism and the drug trade (they're the world's biggest heroin producer).
But that's just a personal opinion - I have no idea if it's politically feasible. But it seems like a package similar to that ought to be possible.
Virginia:
All of the TV's military analysts are former generals and admirals. Where are the retired enlisted personnel? They're the one with tactical experiences.
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: I honestly don't know. I think the media prefers higher officers because they have higher-level command experience. David Hackworth, who retired as a US Army Col., used to be a frequent commentator, but he was pretty volatile and controversial - and also a very highly decorated soldier.
There are a few people who appear in the newspapers who have extensive special forces backgrounds. Michael Vickers is one. You might look for people like that - they have interesting insights into the Afghan situation.
Cathlamet, Wash.:
Good morning.
With the taking of Kabul, does that mean the U.S. will suspend the bombings and allow relief supplies to be brought in to the Afghan civilians?
Thank you.
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: I think we'll be increasing humanitarian relief, but I think even before this weekend the administration had expressed a strong reluctance to end the bombing. I wouldn't expect the Air Force and Navy to suspend military operations - but you might see a much greater commitment to humanitarian relief now that the NA control half the country and we have beeter access to transportation.
Chicago, Ill.:
The lesson of Sept. 11 is that poorer countries with little stake in the global economy will both (a) harbor terrorists especially when there's something in it for them and, (b) become naturally presdisposed to the messages these terrorists have. So, isn't it true that there is little we can do to prevent future terrorist organizations from sprouting up short of providing massive foreign aid to the poorest countries around the world?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: I think helping economies in the poorest parts of the world is a part of the solution. But it's much more complicated, and no single factor will "answer" this very complex problem.
Very rich countries harbor terrorists. Saudi Arabia does. Depending on your definition, so does Ireland (with no offense intended to my Irish friends).
Some countries are held hostage by terrorists - I think you might make this case for Afghanistan. In that case, and in other cases where ordinary citizens have little influence over national decisions, providing economic aid doesn't help. In the former country of Zaire (now a mess), the leaders squandered billions in revenues and amasses vast fortunes through corruption. Further aid wouldn't have helped. In Taliban-run Afghanistan, it's not clear where all our humanitarian aid went - but much of it went to political supporters. The same is true of Iraq under sanctions.
So yes - helping struggling countries get their economies together is part of the answer. But there's a lot more to it, and sometimes you have to overthrow the regimes which support the terrorists, in order to ensure that the people get a chance to share in the economic benefits.
And, of course, overthrowing every repressive regime in the world means the US becomes a very interventionist power, and raises the possibility of open-ended wars.
Fairfax, Va.:
Dr Hoyt,
Do you see an attempt to again micromanage (at least wishfully) a war and forces (the Northern Alliance) that are maybe not amenable to that and perhaps placing somewhat on the backburner, the issue to very actively work towards destroying the Taliban completely.
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: We don't control the NA very well - that's for sure. I think there was some political interference in the war, in an effort to get a replacement government together before we gave whole-hearted support to the NA. The NA didn't like that, got lots of press coverage, and coalition-building efforts fell apart (including the deaths of a couple of former mujaheddin commanders who had infiltrated into the south) - that helped us to reconsider our policy and start a much more serious air support campaign about two weeks ago. This weekend, it bore fruit.
I think the US is still quite serious about destroying the Taliban. We're just seeing it happen in a different way from the manner we'd have preferred. War is like that - "Murphy's Law" is constantly in play. But I don't think anyone is really unhappy about NA's success.
Charlottesville, Va.:
Do you think it makes any sense for the U.S. ground forces to begin a campaign in the South, as soon as possible, to keep up the pressure on the Taliban and prevent consolidation? Also, if such an operation were militarily successful, would it have the politcal benefit of giving the U.S. a better hand in trying to make sure the NA does not impose a nonrepresentative government on the whole country, which of course it did in the past?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: I think there's a strong argument for that, although it has lots of risks. My bet is that the administration is thinking carefully about that right now.
My personal inclination would be to wait to see if the NA is willing to move south. If they are, I'd rather have Afghanistan liberate itself than put US troops on the ground, for a lot of reasons - but I'm running out of time, so I'll answer a couple more questions rather than go into it at length.
Arlington, Va.:
Do you think Bin Laden is now heading south with the Taliban? If not, where is he believed to be hidden? What happens to the Taliban if they are captured in the south?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: I don't really know where Bin Laden is. I think if the Taliban leadership is captured in the south, they will be lucky to get to a trial - there will be lots of people who would prefer them just to be executed. I suspect that right now, Al Qaeda is thinking very seriously about the best way to relocate to safe quarters elsewhere.
Iowa City, Iowa:
Dr. Hoyt, it seems to me that the Northern Alliance has pretty much what it
has really wanted: control of Northern Afghanistan. Do you really think
they're willing to send forces to Southern Afghanistan especially
since the people who live there seem to hate NA more than the Taliban?
Last time I read Taliban forces still outnumber NA forces 2 to 1 or 3 to
1. Furthermore what are the chances of the southern tribal leaders
rebelling against the Taliban? A new central goverment with the NA would
probably give them less influence than it does now. But without such a
rebellion by the southern leaders wouldn't it be pretty difficult for any
U.S. supported force to take over southern Afghanistan without substantial
U.S. ground troops?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: It's a pretty complicated question - let me take a shot at it. I think the odds are pretty good that NA wants to take the country back. I think Taliban's military forces are in bad shape right now, and that their political support is poor, so pushing the war right away holds some promise of quick victory. HOwever, I think you need to bring other Pashtuns into the government and guarantee them some kind of local autonomy or authority (not to mention their safety). US troops complicate the situation - posisbly raising support for Taliban against "foreign invaders", and also possibly alienating the Muslim world.
But I'm reasonably hopeful. The Taliban have truly mismanaged both governing Afghanistan and fighting the war. I think Pashtuns will be seeking alternatives, rather than face a continued long war.
Clearwater, Fla.:
Why didn't we see retreating Taliban and Al Queda forces being bombed like we saw in the Gulf War with Iraq when we saw a highway littered with burned out tanks, trucks, etc.?
Also, shouldn't we be applying extreme pressure on Pakistan not to allow these people to retreat into Pakistan, and if they do to turn them over?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: I think we are pressuring Pakistan, but this is an inredibly porous border and the locals really support Taliban, so there are some problems.
I'm not sure what the story is on attacking the retreating Taliban forces, but there aren't nearly as many of them as there were Iraqis, so that may be one reason we're not seeing it on TV.
East Montpeiler, Vt.:
To deliever humanatian aid will the U.S. be using soliders? I presume so. How many would that be and what difference would those units have than from a ground force to there to fight the Taliban?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: The US works through a lot of nongovernmental organizations, who use locals. We're also dropping food from the air (something Doonesbury has satirized in a very funny way). I'm not sure we'd need to use soldiers.
San Francisco, Calif.:
When the Northern Alliance takes Arabic fighters prisoner, are we going to try to get access to these prisoners to attempt to question them, or, if they don't cooperate, to at least fingerprint, photograph, and take DNA?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: I certainly hope so. I don't know of anything certain to indicate that we're doing that, but at a minimum we could offer a reward for anyone the NA captures who is a foreigner.
Silver Spring, Md.:
I may be morbid by saying this, but has the U.S. considered that the Taliban may be "falling out" because they have a strategy? Bin Laden said they have nuclear weapons... what if he's planning on using them where all of his enemies have gathered and are now celebrating?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: Morbid questions are always reasonable when we're talking about war - a thoroughly morbid subject.
I'd have though if Taliban had a nuke for tactical use that they'd have cranked it out in front of Kabul, where NA forces were attacking on a narrow front.
I suspect that if Al Qaeda really has some kind of unconventional weapon, they'd use it either to protect their leadership or for some spectacular terrorist strike, but that's just a total guess. My own gut feeling is that Bin Laden's nuclear announcement was a response to the US announcements last week about the war on terrorism being a war on weapons of mass destruction.
College Park, Md.:
How likely is the endgame to be the Taliban hunkered down in Kandahar, meeting secretly with U.S. officials to give up bin Laden's hiding place, and then a shift away from attacking the Taliban?
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: I'm not sure it's likely, but I guess it's possible. I'm not sure we're really willing to negotiate with the Taliban leadership anymore. They've been unreliable at best. But they might be able to trade Bin Lade for safe passage or something.
Again, however, that all assumes we can keep the NA under control - which I'm not sure is certain at all.
Bethesda, Md.:
Many of the questions reflect hand-wringing and worrying that, though natural, are I think not warranted.
-- This is a war, and there are casualties in war, so yes, people are dying in Afghanistan, just as people died at the WTC, in the Pentagon, and in those planes, and just as people will continue to die if terrorism is not confronted.
-- The Northern Alliance is not made up of angels, and no one -- I repeat, no one -- in or out of government ever remotely suggested that they were. Yes, we do not control them, and yes, they are going to do some bad things, but that's the way of life in Afghanistan. We can and will seek to influence them to temper those bad things, and by doing so, life will be better in Afghanistan than it otherwise would have been.
-- The Taliban has collapsed faster than expected last week, leading to rapid gains by the Northern Alliance. Yes, this is disconcerting, but it is GOOD NEWS, people, the best news we've had in a long while.
We must remember that bin Laden's terror network is real, and has been focused on causing damage, destruction and death for America. Yes, fighting this terror network is hard and may require temporary alliances with people we otherwise would not care to do business with, but no one said this would be a walk in the park.
Dr. Timothy Hoyt: I think you make some good points.
I think it's a good thing, though, that people are free to ask questions and express worries. This is a war, and a very unusual and complex war, and people should be worried both about the losses and about the impact on American safety and security and on the rest of the world.
I think we also need to keep asking questions. That's the way we make sure that the government is explaining its actions, that we can support them, and that we are fighting this war in a way that our people can support. War is not a preferred solution, but it is not untrammelled violence either. It should be tempered by ethics, morality, and public concern - otherwise, we are no better than Bin Laden.
I would say that the NA success was an unparallelled surprise. When I agreed to do this interview last week, I assumed that most of the questions would be about why we were moving so slowly and what it meant. The weekend truly changed the situation in Afghanistan, and it is indeed a truly positive change. There are many things to still be concerned about, and we should make sure that we do not "cut and run" on Afghanistan AGAIN - we abandoned them in 1990, and it led to chaos. The US should remain engaged there - helping to establish a coalition government, and providing significant funding for humanitarian relief and economic rebuilding of the country. That's the best way to ensure that Afghanistan does not become a terrorist base, or resume its role as a major drug producer (a secondary concern, but still a real one), again.
Thanks to all for your patience and questions!
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